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Abstract 
The Decision Usefulness of Fair Value Accounting in the Debt Market 
Haiping WANG, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2012 
 
 As the two major accounting standard setters, Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), are jointly advocating a full fair 
value disclosure regime, there have been heated discussions regarding the pros and cons of fair 
value versus historical cost among accounting researchers, practitioners, and regulators. Current 
accounting research basically examines the value relevance of fair value accounting from a 
shareholder perspective (e.g., Barth, 1994; Petroni and Wahlen, 1995; Song et al., 2010). In 
comparison, the impact of fair value accounting on the debt market is largely under-investigated. 
As noted by Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003, p.262), “Relative to the literature on equity 
financing patterns, and relative to the actual importance of debt finance in the U.S. economy, the 
literature on debt financing patterns is surprisingly underdeveloped”. Hence, the interface 
between accounting regime and debt financing has recently emerged as a fruitful area for research. 
In fact, creditors, especially public debtholders, have informational and pay-off disadvantages 
that they seek useful accounting information to compensate for.  
 The purpose of this dissertation is twofold: (1) to examine the impact of fair value 
accounting on the debt market; (2) to examine the influence of specialized auditors on the 
association between fair value accounting and the debt market effects. The investigation focuses 
on U.S. bank holding companies issuing debt as they are the reporting entities most affected by 
the advent of fair value accounting. The first essay focuses on the relative explanatory power of 
fair value accounting versus historical cost in explaining credit ratings, a common proxy for firm 
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credit quality. I consider both short-term and long-term credit ratings. Results show that fair value 
accounting outperforms historical cost in explaining firm short-term credit ratings. On the 
contrary, I do not find evidence that fair value accounting is a better predictor of firm long-term 
credit ratings. Additional tests further reveal that auditor industry expertise improves fair value’s 
explanatory power for short-term credit risk. The second essay concentrates on the impact of fair 
value accounting on banks’ cost of debt, proxied by yield spread. Results suggest that greater use 
of fair value accounting measurement in the financial statements is generally associated with a 
lower cost of debt, which supports the argument that fair value accounting improves the decision 
usefulness of accounting information. Findings further show that Level 1 and Level 2 fair value 
inputs are related with a lower cost of debt, while Level 3 fair value inputs are associated with a 
higher cost of debt. In addition, evidence suggests that auditor industry expertise improves the 
decision usefulness of fair value accounting information, especially of Level 3 inputs, resulting in 
lower cost of debt. 
 Overall, these results lead to the conclusion that fair value accounting is generally 
decision useful, although the extent of decision usefulness of fair value varies across the three 
tiers of fair value levels. Besides, the existence of industry specialized auditors improves the 
decision usefulness of fair value accounting to debtholders. However, cautions are advised with 
regard to the implications based on the empirical results, due to the limitations of the 
methodologies used in this dissertation.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This dissertation studies the decision usefulness of fair value accounting in the debt 
market. The application of fair value accounting has been a controversial issue over the 
past two decades, and the recent financial crisis has only exacerbated the controversy. 
Prior research on fair value accounting focuses mainly on the value relevance perspective, 
i.e., the ability of fair value accounting numbers to explain stock price. In contrast, there 
is only scant evidence (e.g., Blankespoor et al., 2010; Cantrell et al., 2011) regarding the 
impact of fair value accounting on the debt market, despite its critical role as the largest 
source of external financing in the U.S. capital market1 (Denis and Mihov, 2003). 
The objective of financial reporting is to provide useful information about the reporting 
entity to existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions 
about providing resources to the entity (FASB, 2010). Debtholder needs for accounting 
information arise from an information asymmetry problem between debtholders and the 
borrowing company, and the related agency conflicts due to asymmetric information. As 
noted by Holthausen and Watts (2001), information relevant for equity investors may not 
be relevant for lenders, and vice versa. That is, debtholder information needs may be 
quite different from those of equity holders. As the major capital provider, then, 
debtholder information needs are far from negligible. Hence, to narrow the existing gap 
in knowledge, this dissertation generates empirical evidence regarding the decision 
usefulness of fair value accounting to debtholders. Specifically, I address the following 
research questions: (1) Does fair value accounting provide more debt contracting value                                                              
1The total value of U.S. corporate debt issuance for the year 2010 amounts to $1,113 trillion, while the total 
value of equity issuance for the same year is only $131 trillion. A similar ratio of total debt issuance to 
equity issuance holds for other years over the past decade (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago). 
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than historical cost accounting, and if so, in what contexts? (2) Does the use of fair value 
accounting in financial reporting better alleviate the information asymmetry problems 
posed to debtholders and therefore lead to a lower cost of debt? (3) Does auditor industry 
expertise strengthen fair value accounting’s debt contracting value and its impact on cost 
of debt? 
Decision usefulness of accounting information is considered the overriding criterion for 
judging accounting choices (Concepts Statement No.2, FASB 1980, para. 30 and 32). 
Among the four dimensions of decision usefulness, relevance and reliability are two 
primary criteria that the FASB uses for choosing among accounting alternatives, as 
specified in its Conceptual Framework (Barth et al., 2001). Information that is both 
relevant and reliable is regarded as informative, or decision useful (Johnson, 2005). 
Decision useful accounting information serves as a solution to the information 
asymmetry problem and facilitates the debtholder decision-making process. Some argue 
that the change of disclosure regime from historical cost to fair value demonstrates that 
the FASB chose to accept a loss of reliability in favor of greater relevance of accounting 
information (e.g., Johnson, 2005). However, it is possible that while some users of 
financial statements prefer relevance to reliability, other users have just the opposite 
preference. Therefore, it is an open question which accounting method, fair value or 
historical cost, is more decision useful to particular groups of users (e.g., shareholders, 
creditors, managers). 
On the one hand, historical cost accounting has the quality of hardness, i.e., easy 
verification and low degree of susceptibility to assumptions and judgment (Ijiri, 1967). 
This is one key reason why it has been the dominant method used in financial reporting 
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for centuries. However, historical cost and values diverge when market and economic 
conditions change. While reliably recording historical cost of an entity’s financial 
position does provide verifiable records for past performance, it does not satisfy the 
information needs of investors (i.e., shareholders and debtholders), who seek relevant 
information that can help predict firms’ expected future performance. 
On the other hand, under a fair value accounting system, assets and liabilities are 
measured by their market value, or estimated market value when market value is not 
observable. In this regard, fair value that provides timely updates of firm financial 
position satisfies the information needs of decision makers, so long as it is reliably 
measured. However, fair value also has flaws that damage its overall decision usefulness. 
First and foremost, some fair value measures suffer from low reliability. When particular 
assets or liabilities have no observable market value, fair value measurement for such 
assets or liabilities may involve managerial discretion and estimation errors. As a result, 
fair value’s increased relevance may come at the cost of lower reliability. 
In addition, some stakeholders (e.g., debtholders, auditors, and regulators) have a natural 
preference for conservative accounting versus fair value accounting (Zhang, 2008; Kim et 
al., 2003; Watts, 1993). Fair value accounting contradicts the rationale of accounting 
conservatism. Under the fair value accounting system, the criterion for recognition of 
asset changes is change in market value, and fair value requires the same degree of 
verification for asset write-ups (good news) as for write-downs (bad news). However, 
conservative accounting requires greater verification for good news than for bad news 
(Basu, 1997). Due to the innate tendency of managers to report good news and to cover-
up bad news (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997), and to compensate for debtholder 
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informational disadvantage and asymmetric pay-off (Wakil, 2011), conservative 
accounting serves as a protective mechanism for debtholders and is documented in the 
literature to improve debt contracting efficiency. Therefore, to the extent that the nature 
of fair value is non-conservative, it may not contribute to efficient debt contracting. 
This dissertation is motivated by the above-mentioned ongoing debate with respect to the 
pros and cons of fair value accounting as opposed to historical cost accounting. It is 
impossible to judge whether fair value accounting improves the overall decision 
usefulness of accounting information from a purely theoretical perspective, because fair 
value accounting trades off a loss of reliability in favor of greater relevance. Therefore, 
empirical evidence regarding the overall decision usefulness of fair value accounting is of 
great importance to standard setters, debtholders, and corporate managers, among others. 
This paper sets forth empirical results regarding the impacts of fair value to debtholders, 
in two dimensions: debt contracting value and cost of debt. Two samples are established 
to test my research questions. The first covers bank holding companies in the U.S. from 
2003 to 2012 that have credit ratings from at least one of the top three rating agencies, 
Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch. The second sample includes bank holding 
companies in the U.S. that issued public bonds during the period 2008–2012. I focus on 
bank holding companies for the following reasons. First, prior disclosure research largely 
excludes the financial sector from analysis, leaving the research on the banking industry 
being underdeveloped. In fact, financial institutions have a unique capital structure and 
operating mode, and thus results based on non-financial industries may not be applicable 
to the banking industry. Therefore, this dissertation adds to the disclosure research by 
exploring the impact of accounting methods on the banking industry. Second, the stability 
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of the banking industry is significantly associated with the prosperity of the economy. 
According to Heffernan (2005), when the stability of the banking system is threatened, 
the financial infrastructure could collapse in the absence of central bank intervention, 
leading to economic crisis. Consequently, the stability of the banking system is essential 
to maintaining the soundness of the macro-economy. Third, from a micro perspective, a 
banking crisis has a real impact on company operations. Studies show that new loans fall 
significantly during a financial crisis (e.g., Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010), resulting in a 
great number of firms becoming financially constrained. Financially constrained firms 
are found to bypass attractive investment opportunities (Campello et al. 2010), indicating 
that the instability of the banks and related financial crises have a real effect on firm 
performance and growth opportunities. Therefore, if fair value contributes to the stability 
of the banking industry, it also has a real impact on firm performance and growth 
opportunities. 
First, I investigate the debt contracting value2 of fair value accounting by examining fair 
value’s relative explanatory power in explaining credit ratings. I find that fair value 
accounting has greater short-term debt contracting value. However, fair value does not 
outperform historical cost in predicting firms’ long-term credit risk. Second, I examine 
whether use of fair value in financial statements leads to lower cost of debt. My empirical 
results show that greater use of fair value in financial statements leads to lower cost of 
debt. This association is stronger for firms that use Level 1 and Level 2 fair value inputs. 
In addition, to address concerns of fair value’s lack of reliability and its lack of protection 
                                                             
2 Debt contracting value of fair value accounting is defined, in Chapter 3, as the relative explanatory power 
of fair value information in explaining credit ratings. 
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for debtholders due to its non-conservative nature, I test whether auditor industry 
expertise improves fair value debt contracting value and strengthens the impact of fair 
value on cost of debt. Auditors with industry expertise are better able to detect both 
managerial manipulation and estimation errors of fair value measurement, if any. Besides, 
the non-conservative concern of fair value accounting can also be alleviated in the 
presence of specialized auditors, who serve as an assuring mechanism regarding the 
reporting quality of financial numbers and as a deterrent to opportunistic booking of 
gains. Consistent with my hypotheses, I find that auditor industry expertise improves fair 
value’s debt contracting value and strengthens the association between the use of fair 
value and firm cost of debt. 
This dissertation contributes to the current accounting literature in several important ways. 
First, it extends the evidence on the decision usefulness of fair value accounting to 
debtholders. The accounting literature mostly focuses on the value relevance of fair value 
accounting from the perspective of shareholders, which has been criticized by Kothari et 
al. (2010) as a narrow interpretation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) objectives. In essence, the role of financial reporting is to provide useful 
information not only to shareholders, but to debt holders, firm management, and standard 
setters as well. Since debt is the major source of external financing in the U.S. capital 
market (Denis and Mihov 2003), the information needs of debtholders are not negligible. 
However, in the accounting literature, especially the fair value accounting literature, debt 
market studies have been largely absent. My paper fills this gap by examining the 
decision usefulness of fair value accounting in the debt market. 
  7 
Second, this study extends evidence on the impact of accounting disclosure on debt 
contracting to financial institutions. Financial institutions, because of their unique capital 
structure and operating mode, are usually excluded in general purpose accounting studies. 
As a result, there is a lack of evidence on how accounting methods affect the information 
environment of financial institutions and their relevant stakeholders. To the best of my 
knowledge, this dissertation is the first study to provide empirical evidence on the 
decision usefulness of fair value accounting to the debtholders of financial institutions.  
Third, this dissertation also adds to the auditing literature by showing that auditor 
industry expertise improves fair value accounting’s decision usefulness to debtholders. 
The existence of independent auditors, especially those with industry expertise, has been 
documented to alleviate agency problems between management and outside investors 
(i.e., shareholders and debtholders). As the main concern over fair value accounting is its 
lack of reliability, which exacerbates information asymmetry and the related agency cost, 
evidence on whether auditor industry expertise alleviates this reliability concern adds 
practical value. 
The findings of this dissertation have implications for standard setters, debtholders, and 
bank managers, among others. While FASB and IASB have been advocating a full fair 
value application for the last two decades, opposing opinions have been voiced as well. 
Opposing views on fair value accounting became stronger during the recent financial 
crisis, and currently from the banking industry, claiming that fair value accounting has 
exacerbated the financial crisis and has put banks in trouble during economic downturns. 
Facing a majority of opposition from over 2,800 comment letters on its fair value 
proposal, the FASB recently announced a reversal on accounting for financial 
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instruments from fair value back to amortized cost for qualifying fixed maturity 
instruments. My findings that fair value accounting is decision useful to debtholders to 
evaluate firms’ short-term risk provide some support for FASB’s proposal for fair value 
accounting of financial instruments while also suggesting cautions when implementing a 
full fair value system. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the 
institutional background of fair value accounting and reviews the literature. Chapter 3 
develops hypotheses, discusses methodologies, and presents empirical results for the debt 
contracting value of fair value accounting. Chapter 4 develops hypotheses, discusses 
methodologies, and presents empirical results for the impact of fair value accounting on 
firm cost of debt. Chapter 5 interprets the findings of this dissertation and draws and 
discusses conclusions. 
Chapter 2 Institutional Background of Fair Value Accounting 
2.1. Definition and Measurement of Fair Value 
Fair value is not a new concept, but its definition was not formalized until the release of 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 157 Fair Value Measurements 
(Financial Accounting Standard Board, thereafter FASB, 2006a).  In this statement, fair 
value is defined as the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a 
liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date 
(FASB, 2006a). In a convergence project in 2006, the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB), based on SFAS 157, developed an International Financial Reporting 
Standard (IFRS) on fair value measurements. The FASB/IASB concept of fair value can 
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be interpreted as the exit market price that would result in a transaction between 
knowledgeable, independent, and economically rational parties under close-to-ideal 
market conditions (Hitz, 2007). 
The measurement of fair value follows a three-tier hierarchy, with a strict preference for 
market-based measures (Accounting Standard Codification [ASC] 820, 2011). According 
to ASC 820, Level 1 inputs are quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets for identical 
assets or liabilities that the reporting entity can access at the measurement date. Level 2 
inputs are quoted prices other than what are included within Level 1 that are observable 
for the asset or liability, either directly or indirectly. Examples of Level 2 inputs include 
interest rates, yield curves, credit spreads, default rates and inputs derived principally 
from market data via such methods as correlation (Scanlon and Lee, 2011). Level 3 
inputs are characterized as unobservable data and are used where observable market 
inputs are not available. Unobservable inputs can involve the company’s own 
understanding about the assumptions market participants would use in pricing the asset. 
 
2.2. Evolution of Fair Value in Accounting Theory and Financial Reporting Regimes 
 
Although the definition and measurement guidelines of fair value were not formalized 
until 2006, the concept of fair value has been in use since approximately 1440. Generally, 
the evolution of fair value application in accounting theory and financial reporting 
regimes can be divided into three phases: 1) 1440 to 1970; 2) 1970-1990; and 3) 1990 to 
the present. 
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1) 1440 to 1970: Early use of fair value in accounting theory and financial reporting 
regimes 
Fair value had partial legitimacy at an early time, but was always superseded by historical 
cost accounting (HCA) or incorporated into mixed measurement practices (Georgiou and 
Jack, 2011). The earliest application of fair value can be traced back to the fifteenth 
century (during the period 1436-1440), when market value began to be used in accounts. 
During this period, the “clear gain” was recognized by totaling the market value of the 
increases in stocks of raw and semi-finished materials over the previous year (Crossley, 
1975). References to market value, rather than cost, occurred in bookkeeping manuals 
from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries (e.g., Pacioli, 1494; Mellis, 1588; Carpenter, 
1632; Dafforne, 1684; Stephens, 1735; Dodson, 1750; Hamilton, 1788). 
An early version of fair value measurement on the balance sheet came into being when 
the Joint Stock Companies Acts of 1844 and 1856 required the “true and correct view” of 
a company’s state of affairs to be disclosed by the valuation of assets at up-to-date prices. 
The basis for this requirement was that values on the balance sheet should reflect the 
capacity to operate the business and to meet outstanding debts (Georgiou and Jack, 2011). 
The first legislated application of market values appears in Napoleon’s 1807 Commercial 
Code, which required inventory to be recorded by its value on the balance sheet day 
(Walton, 2007). At that time, the banking industry measured properties particularly by 
current estimated valuations (Chambers and Wolnizer, 1991). However, market values 
were restricted to use for operating assets as opposed to long-lived assets (Walker, 1974). 
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The origin of the term “fair value” dates back to an 1898 U.S. Supreme Court case in 
which it was held that regulated industries were entitled to earn a “fair return” on the “fair 
value” of the entity (Lee, 2008).  As a result of the judicial acceptance of current values, 
the practice of market value measurement of assets was used in financial reporting by 
U.S. utility companies in the 1920s and 1930s (Georgiou and Jack, 2011). 
The Great Depression taught accountants that values are fleeting and that the value of 
appraised assets can decline significantly in a single day; this resulted in a strengthening 
of the historical-cost–based accounting system (Scott, 2011). According to Zeff (2007), 
the strong opposition to asset write-ups held by Robert E. Healy, one of the five 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) founding members, dominated the Federal 
Trade Commission in the 1930s and 1940s and influenced an entire generation of SEC 
accountants. In 1941, The American Accounting Association (AAA) published an 
important monograph (Patton and Littleton, 1940) that set forth an elegant conceptual 
rationale for the use of HCA. This monograph became a standard text used in university 
accounting curricula and was widely read by practitioners as well (Zeff, 2007). 
The concept of fair value first entered accounting theory in Bonbright (1937), in which 
features of fair value are used in the concept of deprival value. In addition, MacNeal 
(1939) proposes that balance sheet elements be measured in market values and that all 
changes (even unrealized) in the value of assets and liabilities be included in income. 
However, this author does not specify whether the market value applied is the entry or the 
exit price. 
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Post-war inflation and voices of opposition to HCA gave rise to standard setters’ call for 
market value recognition. In 1949, the American Institute of Accountants commissioned 
a series of essays on business income, which included “Five Monographs on Business 
Income,” which dealt mainly with the shortcomings of HCA in a world of changing 
prices (Georgiou and Jack, 2011). In 1966, the AAA committee recommended the use of 
both historical cost and current cost information for financial reporting (AAA: A 
Statement of Basic Accounting Theory-ASOBAT, pp. 30-31). However, in practice, 
HCA was still given prominence. 
2) 1970-1990: Development of fair value in accounting regulation 
In 1973, FASB succeeded the Accounting Principles Board (APB) and issued one of the 
earliest exposure drafts, entitled “Financial reporting in units of general purchasing power” 
(FASB, 1974). Shortly thereafter, in October 1973, the Trueblood Committee Report was 
issued, as a response to the financial scandals and continuous criticism of HCA’s 
deficiencies. This report, titled “Objectives of Financial Statements,” embraced the 
decision usefulness approach and provides the basis of the conceptual framework for 
FASB. It suggests a broad series of valuation bases such as historical cost, exit values, 
current replacement cost, and discounted cash flows (Georgiou and Jack, 2011). FASB 
first included the term “fair value” in APB Opinion 16, Business Combination, in 1970. 
Subsequently, the use of fair value was expanded to fixed assets, revenue recognition, 
and lease accounting (see, APB Opinion 29, 1973 and FASB, 1976). In 1979, the FASB 
issued SFAS No. 33, which required supplementary disclosure of both historical cost and 
current value (FASB, 1979b). However, SFAS No. 33 was withdrawn in 1986 due to 
doubts about comparability, relevance, and reliability, and HCA regained its dominance. 
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A more significant move toward fair value accounting (FVA) occurred at the beginning 
of the 1980s when FASB further acknowledged the deficiencies of the HCA approach 
and promoted the “balance sheet” approach instead (Hitz, 2007). Researchers and 
regulators showed concerns regarding uninformative balance sheets under HCA. As a 
response, FASB adopted the new asset–liability approach in their pronouncement 
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 3 in 1980, which links income 
strictly to changes in net assets. Since then, the debate on the merits of HCA versus FVA 
has been ongoing. 
The Savings and Loan Crisis in the US in the 1980s accelerated the shift toward the fair 
value paradigm and opened the door to further unraveling the deficiencies of the 
historical cost-based reporting system. Accordingly, the SEC advised FASB to develop a 
standard on accounting for certain debt securities at market value rather than amortized 
cost (Wyatt, 1991; Cole, 1992; White, 2003). The rationale for this initiative was that 
HCA allowed for gains trading by firm managers and prohibited identification of the 
financial status of Savings and Loans. As Hitz (2007) comments, this initiative represents 
a major evolution in accounting thought on the regulatory level.  
3) 1990-2007: Fair value advances 
FVA saw rapid advancement during the 1990s. In 1991, FASB issued SFAS 107, 
Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, which extends fair value 
disclosure practices for some instruments by requiring all entities to disclose the fair 
value of financial instruments. In 1993, FASB issued SFAS 115, Accounting for Certain 
Investments in Debt and Equity Securities. This statement provides guidance on the 
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valuation of investments in equity securities that have readily determinable fair values 
and for all investments in debt securities (FASB, 1993). It identifies three types of 
investment security: debt securities held to maturity (i.e., held-to-maturity securities), 
debt and equity securities used for trading (i.e., trading securities), and debt and equity 
securities not classified as either of the previous two types (i.e., available-for-sale 
securities). SFAS 115 requires that trading securities and available-for-sale securities be 
measured under fair value, while held-to-maturity securities are to be measured under 
historical cost. The realized gains and losses of held-to-maturity securities and the 
unrealized gains and losses of trading securities are recognized in income. By contrast, 
the unrealized gains and losses of available-for-sale securities are reported in other 
comprehensive income. In the latter years of the 1990s, FASB issued a series of 
statements that expanded the fair value application, including: SFAS 119 Disclosure 
about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments; SFAS 
121 Accounting for the Impairment of Long-lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to be 
Disposed of; and SFAS 123 Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation. During this 
period, accounting scholars added to the fair value debate by addressing some 
fundamental issues regarding the validity and relevance of FVA in the conceptual 
framework of financial reporting (e.g., Barth and Landsman, 1995). 
By 2007, fair value had both acquired an expanded significance and generated 
controversy in the accounting policy-making process (Power, 2010). FVA serves as a 
resolution to the increasing intolerance of the incoherence of mixed measurement 
systems. FASB issued SFAS 157 Fair Value Measurements, and 159 The Fair Value 
Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities in 2006 and 2007, respectively. 
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These two statements expand the list of items to be fair valued by adding loans receivable 
and payable, investments in equity securities, written loan commitments, firm 
commitments regarding financial instruments, rights and obligations under insurance 
contracts, rights and obligations related to warranty agreements and host financial 
instruments that are separated from embedded derivative instruments (Emerson et al., 
2010). In addition, for the first time, fair value was officially defined and the fair value 
measurement was specified. According to FASB, these pronouncements aim to increase 
consistency and comparability in fair value measurements and for expanded disclosures 
about fair value measurements (FASB, 2006), and to improve financial reporting by 
reducing volatility in reported earnings caused by measuring related assets and liabilities 
differently (FASB, 2007). The IASB develop similar definition and measurement method 
in 2006, in its convergence project (IASB, 2006). 
A vigorous debate on the usefulness of FVA arose in association with the financial crisis 
of 2007–2009. U.S. industry groups pressured the SEC and FASB to significantly alter or 
suspend the fair value rules, claiming they undermine the government’s effort to stabilize 
the country’s financial sector (Emerson et al., 2010). The American Bankers Association, 
in its letter to the SEC in September 2008, states that the problems that exist in today’s 
financial markets can be traced to many different factors. One factor that is recognized as 
having exacerbated these problems is fair-value accounting” (Laux and Leuz, 2009). 
Meanwhile, Wallison (2008) argues that FVA has been the principal cause of an 
unprecedented decline in asset values and an unprecedented rise in instability among 
financial institutions. 
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Despite strong opposition from the banking industry, FASB (2010) proposed that all 
financial instruments be measured at fair value in financial statements. As Linsmeier 
(2010) argues, HCA leads to consistent and dramatic underestimation of credit and 
impairment losses in both the most recent crisis and in previous crises in the banking 
sector. However, in 2011, FASB tentatively withdrew the requirement to book loans held 
to maturity at fair value after receiving a large number of comment letters and strong 
opposition at global roundtables (Whitehouse, 2011). 
FASB’s most recent effort to address the measurement issues of fair value is the issuance 
of the ASC Topic 820 Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures, and its amendment, 
Fair Value Measurements. This statement provides more detailed guidance regarding 
measurement of fair value inputs. In addition, this statement requires enhanced 
disclosures for fair value measurements categorized within Level 3 of the fair value 
hierarchy. 
The evolution of fair value in IASB follows a similar path compared with FASB. In 1989, 
the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) published the Framework of 
Principles, which has similarities to the FASB framework. The first introduction of a 
mixed historical cost/current value measurement system was through the pronouncement 
of Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 15 Tangible Fixed Assets, which permits a choice 
as to whether tangible fixed assets are reported at cost or at a revalued amount. 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement, provides a full fair value option and certain provisions relating to hedge 
accounting, which is regarded consolidating the principles of the IASB in respect of fair 
values (Georgiou and Jack, 2011). In 2000, two additional innovative steps took place: 
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IAS 40 Investment Property, which applies FVA to nonfinancial assets, and IAS 41 
Agriculture, which requires the FVA model to be implemented by all enterprises that 
undertake agricultural activity. In 2009, IASB published International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) 9 Financial Instruments that will replace IAS 39 in three 
phases: Phase 1 Classification and measurement, Phase 2 Impairment Methodology, and 
Phase 3 Hedge accounting. Other than the above-mentioned IAS pronouncements, 
IASC’s effort in promoting FVA is in line with that of FASB. 
Looking back over the development of fair value in the financial reporting regime, it is 
obvious that fair value is increasingly favored by standard setters. The trend toward fair 
value arises due to the deficiencies of the HCA method and to the demand for timely and 
relevant information, especially during economic downturns. However, both researchers 
and standard setters acknowledge that fair value has its Achilles’ heels, just as does any 
other accounting alternative. Therefore, it would be interesting to generate evidence 
regarding the decision usefulness of FVA numbers to financial statement users, which is 
exactly the purpose of this thesis. 
2.3 Theoretical Analysis on Decision Usefulness of FVA 
The FASB’s Conceptual Framework states that the purpose of financial reporting is to 
provide information that is useful for business decisions (Concepts Statement No. 1, 
FASB 1978, para. 34), and it considers decision usefulness the overriding criterion for 
judging accounting choices (Concepts Statement No.2, FASB 1980, para. 30 and 32). 
Decision usefulness is defined in terms of relevance, reliability, comparability, and 
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understandability (Spiceland et al. 2005). In this section, I provide a review of the 
theoretical analysis on the four dimensions of decision usefulness of fair value. 
2.3.1 Relevance 
Relevance is defined as the capacity of information to make a difference in a decision by 
helping users to form predictions about the outcomes of past, present, and future events 
or to confirm or correct prior expectations (FASB, 1980). Relevance is one of the 
fundamental qualitative characteristics of accounting information, as articulated in early 
conceptual frameworks (FASB, 1980). Fair value is conceptually relevant because it 
accurately reflects the market’s assessment of current economic conditions, which is 
directly useful for investor decision making (Emerson et al., 2010). Investors are 
concerned with value, not cost. With passage of time, historical costs become irrelevant 
in assessing a firm’s current financial position (Penman, 2007). Fair values provide up-to-
date information about the value of the firm’s net assets. 
Note that the relevance of fair value relies on the assumption of market efficiency. If the 
market is efficient with respect to publicly available information at all times, observed 
market prices reflect true fundamental values, and in such cases fair value is relevant. 
However, markets are not efficient when there are transaction costs and limits to arbitrage, 
and market prices may be subject to behavioral biases and investor irrationality (Barberis 
and Thaler, 2003; Shleifer, 2000). Under such circumstances, observed market prices 
deviate from fundamentals. Nevertheless, even if fair value does not reflect firm 
underlying value, historical cost does not do a better job. Historical cost is notorious for 
obscuring underlying problems due to lack of updated accounting information.  Therefore, 
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it may be better to use market values, even if the market is illiquid, and to supplement 
these values with additional disclosures (e.g., management estimates of fundamental 
values) (Laux and Leuz, 2009). 
However, many bankers criticize the low relevance of fair value measurement when 
market prices are rapidly falling and/or when markets are illiquid. They argue that it was 
the FASB’s fair value requirement that caused much of the problem during the recent 
financial crisis (King, 2009). During a financial crisis, such as that of 2007–2009, 
estimates of fair value are said to be distorted by forced sales, or fire sales. However, the 
definition of fair value applies to orderly transactions, not forced sales. In addition, even 
if market prices are falling, fair values are still relevant in the sense that they reflect real 
economic conditions (Prochazka, 2011). Proponents of fair value point to areas such as 
pension accounting or the savings and loans industry in North America, where fair value 
would have made problems (e.g., deficits, poorly performing loans) visible much earlier, 
thereby enabling timely corrective action. An often heard trope is that one ‘should not 
shoot the messenger’ of poor asset quality (Power, 2011). As King (2009, p. 31) 
comments, blaming FVA for the financial problems of banks misses the point, because 
“not disclosing current prices is like breaking a thermometer if you think the temperature 
is too hot. It is the heat, not the thermometer, that causes the discomfort.” Similarly, it 
was low prices, not fair values, that caused the financial crisis. 
2.3.2 Reliability 
Reliability is defined as the quality of information that assures information is reasonably 
free from error and bias and faithfully represents what it purports to represent (FASB, 
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1980). Reliability is also one of the fundamental qualitative characteristics of accounting 
information as articulated in early conceptual frameworks (FASB, 1980). The traditional 
view of accounting reliability lies in the verifiability of accounting numbers (Barth, 2007). 
One of the explicit motivations for the expanded significance of the use of fair value is its 
perceived potential to minimize the freedom to manipulate accounting numbers (CFA, 
2007). Conceptually, market-based values are free from manipulation and therefore are 
highly reliable. When dealing with financial assets, the HCA model allows firms to 
structure and account for transactions in a way that income could be easily managed, and 
yet remain in compliance with GAAP (e.g., cherry picking). FVA could eliminate the 
opportunity for management to manipulate earnings. Practically, however, only Level 1 
fair values are free from manipulation. Level 2 and Level 3 fair values, which are based 
on managerial discretion and model estimation, are subject to estimation errors and/or 
manipulation. As Emerson et al. (2010) comment, manipulation of reported fair values 
can result in the very effect that FVA is designed to eliminate, which is evidenced by 
many recent large frauds that were “enabled” by the move toward FVA.3 An effective 
countermeasure to the estimation/manipulation problem is increased disclosure of the 
underlying assumptions used when estimating fair value (Emerson et al., 2010). Luckily, 
such a disclosure requirement has just recently been implemented in the recent ASC 820 
(FASB, 2011), in which the standard setter takes effective steps to improve the reliability 
of fair value measures. 
As Ijiri and Jaedicke (1966) argue, definitions of accounting reliability may change over 
time. Barth (2007) challenges the verifiability interpretation of reliability and proposes a                                                              
3 For example, many of Enron’s valuation overstatements were based on fair value estimates (Benston, 
2006). 
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reframing of reliability with faithful representation: “just because an amount can be 
calculated precisely, it is not necessarily a faithful representation of the real-world 
economic phenomena it purports to represent” (Barth, 2007, p. 10). The new conception 
of accounting reliability essentially collapses reliability into relevance, rather than trading 
them off one another. Jones (1988, p. 56) points out that historical cost no longer 
“faithfully represents the economic realities of today’s complex instruments.” In the 
sense that fair value measures provide more relevant information, they also improve 
faithful representation of accounting numbers. 
2.3.3 Comparability 
Comparability is defined as the quality of information that enables users to identify 
similarities in and differences between two sets of economic phenomena (FASB, 1980). 
Generally, the use of fair value improves the comparability of accounting information 
across firms. When there is an active market, the fair value of an asset depends on the 
market price of the asset itself, rather than within the context of the entity that owns it 
(Emerson, 2010). Using a single measurement attribute alleviates the problems associated 
with the present use of multiple measurement attributes. As a result, FVA would reduce 
the anomalies of the existing mixed accounting approach and the need for complex and 
subjective hedge accounting (Chisnall, 2000). As Barth (2006, p. 274) criticizes, the use 
of multiple measures for financial instrument valuation is “not only conceptually 
unappealing, but also creates difficulties for financial statement users.” 
However, problems arise when an active market does not exist and when it is necessary 
to use a valuation model to estimate fair value. Under such circumstances, the 
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comparability of financial statements may be called into question, as fair values for the 
same asset can differ across firms (Prochazka, 2011). Therefore, clear guidance on fair 
value measurement serves as an important factor in ensuring the comparability of fair 
values. 
2.3.4 Understandability 
Understandability refers to the attribute that users of financial reports will perceive the 
significance of a reported item to their decisions (FASB, 1980). Such perception involves 
understanding the economic effects of a firm’s actions and their measurement. 
Information provided in financial statements should be readily understandable to users 
with reasonable knowledge. On the one hand, fair value improves the understandability 
of financial reporting, because using market value as the measurement basis is straight-
forward to financial statement users. On the other hand, however, it is arguable that 
understanding some fair values requires specific knowledge that ordinary financial 
statement users may not have. Some bankers show their concern regarding the 
understandability of fair value information. As quoted in The Wall Street Journal 
(December 17, 1991), Donna Fisher, manager of accounting policy for the 9,000-member 
American Bankers Association commented that it is be very difficult to set a fair value on 
many commercial and industrial loans, which are often unique in value and lending terms. 
This means that it is equally difficult, if not more, for investors and regulators to 
understand the fair value of commercial and industrial loans. 
In sum, conceptually, fair value outweighs historical cost in providing relevant, reliable, 
comparable and understandable accounting information. However, when active markets 
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do not exist, the relevance, reliability, comparability, and understandability of fair value 
are called into question. The net effect of the decision usefulness of FVA information is 
therefore an empirical question. In addition, detailed guidance regarding fair value in 
inactive or illiquid markets provides possible room for improving the usefulness of fair 
value. 
2.4 Empirical Evidence on FVA 
2.4.1 Value Relevance of Fair Value in the Equity Market 
Accounting information is considered value relevant if it has the predicted association 
with market value of equity (Barth et al. 2001). Value-relevant accounting information is 
both relevant to investors and reliable enough to be reflected in share prices (Song et al., 
2010). A large number of FVA studies focus on the value relevance of fair value 
information. 
A major stream of the above-mentioned studies investigates the value relevance of 
financial instruments in the U.S. banking industry. One way to test the value relevance of 
fair value information is to examine whether fair value has incremental information 
content over and above historical cost. The results of these studies are mixed. Based on a 
sample of bank data between 1971 and 1990, Barth (1994) finds that fair value of 
investment securities is more value relevant than their historical cost. Similar to Barth 
(1994), Petroni and Wahlen (1995) investigate relevance and reliability of fair values of 
equity and debt securities for property-liability insurers between 1985 and 1991. These 
authors find that only fair values of items traded in active markets are value relevant. In 
addition, and inconsistent with the Barth (1994) results, Petroni and Wahlen (1995) find a 
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significant and positive relation between stock returns and changes in unrealized gains 
and losses for insurance companies, indicating that fair value securities gains and losses 
are value relevant in the insurance industry. This result is also supported by Ahmed and 
Takeda (1995), which includes more on-balance-sheet net assets in the estimation 
equations. Three other concurrent studies examine the relation between bank share prices 
and fair value of financial instruments, as required under FAS 107. Eccher et al. (1996) 
show that fair value of investment securities is significantly value relevant, but results on 
fair value of other asset and liability variables are mixed and weak. Nelson (1996) finds 
that over the period 1992–1993, the fair value of financial instruments had no incremental 
power to explain market-to-book ratio, with the exception of investment securities in 
1992. On the contrary, Barth et al. (1996) provide evidence that fair value of loans over 
the 1992–93 period is incrementally value relevant beyond related book values. In the 
same vein, Park et al. (1999) show that unrealized gains and losses of available-for-sale 
securities, held-to-maturity securities, and loans are incrementally value relevant in 
explaining annual returns. 
Biddle et al. (1995) point out that the mapping between an incremental and a relative 
information content is not one-to-one. In essence, a result that fair value is incrementally 
informative can imply that fair value is as informative as, or more, or less informative 
than historical cost. Therefore, tests for relative information content provide more direct 
implications regarding which measure contains more information content. Accordingly, 
another line of studies examines the relative explanatory power of fair value and 
historical cost in explaining equity values. For example, Khurana and Kim (2003) 
compare the relative explanatory power of fair value and historical cost in explaining 
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equity values, using the fair value disclosures made under FAS 107 and FAS 115. These 
authors find no significant difference in the informativeness of fair value measures 
relative to historical cost measures. However, they find for small bank holding companies 
and those with no analysts following, that historical cost measures of loans and deposits 
are more informative than fair value. 
Following the issuance of SFAS 157, several studies examine the value relevance of the 
three tiers of fair value in the U.S. banking industry. Using similar approaches and data, 
Song et al. (2010), Goh et al. (2009), and Kolev (2009) all find that investors discount 
Level 3 fair value estimates due to reliability issues during the financial crisis. However, 
Song et al. (2010) show that value relevance for Level 3 estimates is greater for banks 
with stronger corporate governance. Kolev (2009) and Goh (2009) find that valuation 
coefficient of Level 1 and Level 2 assets is also significantly less than one, probably due 
to financial market instability and the uncertainty of investors over banks’ asset values. 
In addition to financial assets, several studies provide evidence on the value relevance of 
fair value nonfinancial assets such as pensions under SFAS 87 (Barth 1991; Barth et al. 
1992), derivatives under SFAS 119 (Venkatachalam 1996; Ahmed et al. 2006), and 
tangible long-lived assets under SFAS 33 (Beaver and Landsman 1983; Beaver and Ryan 
1985; Lobo and Song 1989). These studies show evidence that, if there are no active 
markets for these assets and liabilities or the estimates are determined by management, 
investors tend to discount recognition and disclosure of fair value and consider them to be 
less relevant and reliable. Management discretion and estimation errors might be the 
explanations for this. 
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Some studies also examine whether the value relevance of fair value measurements is a 
function of the reliability of the information. For example, both Dietrich et al. (2000) and 
Muller and Riedl (2002) show that the reliability of fair value estimates is positively 
associated with the presence of external appraisals.  However, Barth and Clinch (1998) 
find no such association. 
Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2011) is an international study that examines the value 
relevance of fair value using a global sample of 322 banks that apply IFRS during the 
period 2007–2009. This study applies a modified Ohlson (1995) model and finds that fair 
value is value relevant and that the pricing of fair value differs across firm-specific and 
institutional factors. In addition, this study sets forth evidence that fair value experienced 
a substantial discount during the financial crisis of that period. 
Overall, the above value relevance studies provide generally consistent evidence that 
FVA is value relevant to equity holders. However, the value relevance of FVA differs 
across items reported in the financial statements, indicating that a full fair value 
application may not be a panacea to improving the decision usefulness of financial 
reporting. Therefore, one promising research avenue is to examine in what scenarios fair 
value works well. Another is to study other possible consequences of fair value 
application, other than the stock market effect. 
2.4.2 Value Relevance of Fair Value in the Debt Market 
In addition to shareholders, debtholders also demand accounting information for decision 
making and debt contracting purposes. According to Armstrong et al. (2010), financial 
reporting provides information to debtholders regarding the downside risk and evaluation 
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of firm collateral, as well as information useful in assessing the timing and riskiness of 
firms’ expected future cash flows from existing projects and anticipated investments. 
However, there is scant empirical evidence regarding the decision usefulness of fair value 
measures in the debt market. One notable exception is Blankespoor et al. (2010), which 
examines the relation between bank credit risk exposure and bank leverage measured 
under various accounting systems (full fair value for financial instruments, current GAAP 
accounting systems, historical cost systems, and Tier 1 capital). This study finds that 
bank leverage measured under a full fair value system is at least six times more highly 
correlated with the TED spread (i.e., the difference between interest rates on interbank 
loans and on short-term U.S. government debt) than is leverage measured under any other 
accounting model, suggesting that fair value information gives a much more accurate 
picture of banks’ financial condition. In addition, Cantrell et al. (2011) examine the 
ability of loan fair value to predict credit losses relative to the ability of net historical 
costs currently recognized under U.S. GAAP. These authors find that net historical loan 
costs are generally a better predictor of credit losses than loan fair values. 
Based on the above review of the fair value literature, there is  limited evidence regarding 
the impact of fair value in the debt market. According to Kothari et al. (2010), both 
equity holders and debt holders need verifiable accounting information for decision 
making. Debtholders’ information needs arise from the moral hazard problems 
attributable to agency conflicts and asset substitution risks related to asymmetric 
information. FVA information has the controversial characteristic that it improves the 
relevance of financial reporting at the cost of lower reliability, especially for assets and 
liabilities measured using Levels 2 and 3. Therefore, it is unclear whether implementation 
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of fair value improves or worsens decision usefulness to debtholders. Therefore, in order 
to narrow this gap, this dissertation examines 1) the decision usefulness of fair value 
information relative to that of historical cost in terms of the explanatory power of credit 
ratings, and 2) the effect of the use of FVA on cost of debt. The evidence set forth in this 
dissertation adds to our understanding regarding the circumstances in which fair value 
outperforms historical cost as well as the impact of implementing fair value on firm 
borrowing. 
Chapter 3 Fair Value Accounting and Credit Ratings 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
The conceptual framework underlying my empirical tests is rooted in the agency 
problems of moral hazard and asset substitution created by the existence of information 
asymmetries among contracting parties. First, from the perspective put forward by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), due to the existence of information asymmetry, there is an agency 
conflict between the principal (e.g., shareholders and debtholders) and agent (managers). 
Taking a debtholder perspective, there is agency cost between debtholders and managers 
acting on behalf of shareholders. Under such circumstances, it is generally impossible for 
the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions 
from the principal’s viewpoint, thus leading to a moral hazard problem. The moral hazard 
problem, which may take the form of shirking, perquisite consumption, 
overcompensation, or empire building by the agent, results in an increase of the agency 
risk and decreases the expected value of a firm’s future cash flow (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2006). As default risk is a negative function of a firm’s future cash flow to debtholders 
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(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006), the existence of the moral hazard problem increases the 
default risk of bondholders.  
Second, from the perspective put forward by Black and Scholes (1973) in their path-
breaking work on option valuation, shareholders may be viewed as holding a European 
call option to buy back the entire firm at an exercise price equal to the face value of the 
debt. In the same vein, debtholders can be regarded as taking a long position in the firm 
assets and a short position in the call option. Because the value of the call option is an 
increasing function of the variance of the cash flows of the firm, stockholders have an 
incentive to engage in high-risk activities at the expense of debtholders. Debtholders face 
the risk that the debt is initially issued for engaging in low variance (low risk) activities 
but later on stockholders shift to high-risk projects. Debtholders do not receive a bonus 
for excess gains derived from investing in risky projects, but they will lose their 
contractual claims if the project fails. However, shareholders take all the investment gains 
in excess of contractual payment to debtholders, but will lose only the portion they invest 
in case of a failure. If both the low and high-risk projects yield the same expected return, 
the asset substitution does not alter the total value of the firm, but it transfers wealth from 
debtholders to stockholders. As a result, debtholders’ asymmetric payoff function leads to 
greater risk bearing.  
One solution to the above two agency conflicts is to provide accounting information to 
alleviate the information asymmetry problems. If accounting information faithfully 
delivers timely information to debtholders regarding the financial health (or credit risk) of 
the company, based on the above analysis, such information can help mitigate 
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information asymmetries posed to debtholders and improve the efficiency of debt 
contracting. 
As standard setters are moving towards a full fair value based measurement regime for 
financial institutions, a relevant question to ask is whether fair value accounting makes 
financial reporting more decision-useful to debtholders? This dissertation aims to answer 
this question by examining the relative decision-usefulness of fair value in explaining 
credit ratings and bond yield spreads.  
On the one hand, fair value accounting should be more decision-useful than historical 
cost based accounting.  The merit of fair value accounting is that it reflects the true (and 
relevant) value of the firms’ financial position, by reporting assets and liabilities directly 
at their current market value. Therefore, debtholders are informed of changes of firm 
value whenever the market value of firms’ financial instruments change. This rapid 
information update enables debtholders and policy makers to better access firms’ risk 
profile and to undertake more timely market discipline and corrective actions. Therefore 
debtholders can retrieve their claim as much as possible before further deterioration of 
firm value. Another advantage of fair value accounting, theoretically speaking, is its ease 
of verification. When firms’ assets and liabilities are separable and have a liquid market, 
firms’ value under fair value accounting is highly reliable, because the market value of 
each asset and liability is free of manipulation. On the contrary, historical cost accounting 
gives management considerable latitude in determining the carrying value of assets or 
liabilities (i.e., the carrying value of loans is determined by book value of loans minus 
loan loss provisions, the latter of which is determined by managerial estimation)(General 
Accounting Office, 1991). Linsmeier (2010) also points out that management-determined 
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impairment losses are consistently and dramatically underestimated in the most recent 
crisis.  
On the other hand, there is concern that fair value accounting lacks reliability, is counter-
conservatism, introduces excess volatility in reported financial performance, and 
contributes to procyclicality (see, e.g., Laux and Leuz, 2009; Penman, 2007; Plantin et al., 
2007; Allan and Carletti, 2008a). First, among the three levels of fair value inputs, Level 
2 and Level 3 inputs are subject to estimation errors and/or managerial manipulations. 
According to FASB (2006a), Level 2 inputs are inputs other than quoted prices included 
within Level 1 that are observable for the asset or liability either directly or indirectly. 
Level 3 inputs are unobservable inputs and are developed based on the best information 
available in the circumstances, which might include the reporting entity’s own data. As a 
result, managers have discretion regarding the measurement of Level 2 and Level 3 
inputs, making financial reporting biased and less reliable (Menini, Parbonetti and 
Magnan, 2012). That is, the use of fair value accounting may make accounting 
information less informative to debtholders.  
 
Second, considering debtholders’ asymmetric payoff function, they care more about the 
lower bound of firm value. Under historical cost accounting, assets are written down 
when their market value goes below the book value, but are not written up when the 
market value reverses (i.e., accounting conservatism). Such asymmetric write-offs better 
protect debtholders by biasing firm value more towards its lower bound. On the contrary, 
fair value allows for both asset write-down and write-up. As a result, the symmetric asset 
write-off renders fair value less protective to debtholders.  
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Third, under the fair value accounting measurement regime, the value of assets and 
liabilities changes as their market value fluctuates. As a consequence, the value of 
balance sheet items may be driven by short-term fluctuations in the market that do not 
reflect the value of the fundamentals and the long-term values of assets and liabilities 
(Allen and Carletti, 2008b).  
Last but not least, fair value accounting has been claimed to cause procyclicality and 
contagion when markets are illiquid (Allan and Carletti, 2008a). In times of financial 
crisis, prices in illiquid markets do not reflect future payoffs but rather reflect the amount 
of cash available to buyers in the market. If accounting values are based on market prices, 
the volatility of asset prices directly affects the value of banks’ assets, which in turn leads 
to distortions in banks’ portfolio and contagion (Allan and Carletti, 2008a).  
Based on the above analysis, fair value accounting could also be less decision-useful to 
debtholders, compared to historical cost accounting. Therefore, it is an open question 
with respect to whether and when fair value accounting is more decision-useful than 
historical cost accounting for debt contracting purpose. 
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
In this section, I develop arguments as to whether fair value accounting has greater debt 
contracting value than historical cost accounting. I define that accounting information has 
debt contracting value if it has explanatory power in explaining credit ratings4. Credit 
ratings are used as tools for mitigating the principal-agent problems and are used as proxy                                                              
4 According to Ball et al. (2008), accounting information has debt contracting value if current and lagged 
quarterly earnings can predict credit downgrades. However, their definition does not apply to my study 
because earnings is simply a by-product of changes of assets and liabilities under fair value measurement 
regime and therefore should not  be used as the single predictor of credit ratings or credit downgrades.  
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for a firm’s riskiness (Cantor, 2004) and are found to measure credit risks with 
reasonable accuracy (Horrigan, 1966; Cantor and Packer, 1995). Therefore, if accounting 
information can predict corporate credit ratings, it is decision-useful for debt contracting 
purpose.  
I focus on the fair value of financial instruments in bank holding companies, the 
disclosure of which is mandated by FASB. A financial instrument is cash, evidence of an 
ownership interest in an entity, or a contract that both imposes on one entity a contractual 
obligation and conveys to that second entity a contractual right (FASB, 2009). In essence, 
banks are collections of financial contracts (Linsmeier, 2010), and therefore financial 
instruments comprise a great portion of the assets in banks’ balance sheets. The value of 
financial instruments fluctuates as interest rates and economic conditions change, and 
consequently quickly alter a bank’s financial profile. Measuring financial instruments 
under historical cost fails to capture the changes in value of financial assets and liabilities. 
Under historical cost accounting system, banks’ management assesses the value of the 
financial instruments at amortized cost and books impairment charges against them only 
if they have suffered either an actual or an “other-than-temporary” loss in value. This 
assessment involves judgment, and according to Linsmeier (2010), bank managers have 
an extremely poor record in recognizing losses, as many banks with seemingly “healthy” 
balance sheets have failed all of a sudden.  
In addition, as many researchers argue, fair value accounting does not work well in all 
situations (Allen and Carletti, 2008b). Therefore, in this study, I investigate the debt 
contracting value of fair value accounting in different scenarios (short-term credit ratings 
versus long-term credit ratings; with or without auditor industry expertise). 
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3.2.1 Fair Value Accounting and Short-Term Credit Risk 
Credit ratings are divided into short-term and long-term categories based on the form of 
debt instrument concerned (Reuters Guide to Credit Ratings, 2007). According to a 
DBRS Rating Polices Rating Scales (DBRS), short-term funding exposes issuers and 
investors to a somewhat different set of risks and considerations than long-term funding. 
The difference is primarily due to liquidity considerations within the shorter maturity 
duration. Therefore I distinguish between short-term and long-term credit risk and 
develop hypotheses with respect to fair value’s debt contracting value regarding the two 
types of credit ratings respectively.  
Short-term credit ratings evaluate the credit risk of a firm’s short-term debt or 
commercial paper5. A firm’s short-term credit risk is associated with its ability to use 
short-term assets to repay short-term liabilities. When a firm’s current liabilities are due, 
it sells its current assets at market value and uses the proceedings to repay the current 
liabilities. Therefore, it is easy to see that a firm’s short-term credit risk is associated with 
the market value of its current assets. However, for the purpose of evaluating the short-
term credit risk of a company, historical cost based accounting information is 
inappropriate, because the acquisition cost of the assets and liabilities may deviate from 
the price the firm can sell its assets for. The problem of historical cost accounting for 
predicting short-term credit risk is documented in the finance literature where researchers 
identify a phenomenon called incomplete accounting information around the time of 
default, especially on short-term debt (Beneish and Press, 1995; Duffie and Lando, 1997). 
                                                             
5 Commercial paper is a short-term unsecured promissory note with a fixed maturity of 1 to 270 days 
(Abken, 1981). 
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The rationale for short-term debt default, according to Duffie and Lando (1997), is that 
under the historical cost-based accounting system, since information is not reflected in a 
timely manner, around the time of default, substantial accounting information about the 
issuer will be revealed to the market, causing a jump in market information. The jump 
caused by incomplete information substantially shocks the market and the firms’ market 
value is greatly written down, leading to a default. If accounting information were based 
on fair value measurement, the negative shock would be revealed on a timely basis, thus 
providing an immediate signal to the market for prompt corrective actions. That is to say, 
fair value accounting corrects the information jump problem by providing timely updates 
of firms’ value. As a result, at any point in time, including around the maturity of short-
term debt, there will not be information shock to the market. Therefore, I argue that in 
terms of firms’ short-term credit risk, fair value accounting provides greater debt 
contracting value than historical cost accounting.  
H1: Fair value accounting provides greater short-term debt contracting value than 
historical cost accounting does.   
3.2.2 Fair Value Accounting and Long-Term Credit Risk 
A firm’s long-term credit risk is associated with the likelihood that a firm’s future cash 
flows will be sufficient to cover debt service costs and principal payments and are 
determined by the probability distribution of future cash flows to bondholders 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). In a long-term horizon, the evolution of firm value 
follows a diffusion process (see, e.g., Merton, 1974, Black and Cox, 1976, Longstaff and 
Schwartz, 1995). Under a diffusion process, firm value is a function of discounted future 
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cash flows, and is almost insulated from the impact of market value fluctuations. Sudden 
drops in the firm value are impossible, which is consistent with the rationale of using 
historical cost accounting as a measurement method. In this case, fair value accounting 
information may not add much to the efficiency of debt contracting, because the 
temporary volatility of firm value is not predictive of firm value at maturity. As 
documented by Plantin et al. (2008), fair value increases the inefficiency of accounting 
information to assets that are long-lived, and the reverse is true for sufficiently short-lived 
assets.  Therefore, I predict that in terms of firms’ long-term credit risk, historical cost 
accounting provides greater debt contracting value than fair value accounting.  
H2: Historical cost accounting provides greater long-term debt contracting value than 
fair value accounting does.   
3.2.3 Auditor Industry Expertise and Debt Contracting Value of Fair Value 
Accounting 
Auditors’ industry expertise plays an important role in determining the debt contracting 
value of fair value accounting, because high quality monitoring is likely to effectively 
mitigate the information asymmetry problem posed by less verifiable fair values (Penman 
[2007]). Both training and experience increase the auditor’s domain knowledge of a 
specific industry, and specialized industry knowledge reduces errors in judgment 
(Solomon, Shields, and Whittington, 1999). According to Balsam et al. (2003), firms with 
auditor specialists have better earnings quality than firms of non-specialists. Using the 
banking industry as an instrumental setting, Low (2004) provides experimental evidence 
that the auditors’ knowledge of the client’s industry improves their audit risk assessments 
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and the perceived quality of audit planning decisions. Krishnan (2005) finds that earnings 
of the firms that are audited by specialists are more timely in reflecting bad news than 
earnings of firms audited by non-specialist, indicating that auditor specialists play a better 
monitoring role than non-specialists. Therefore, auditors with industry expertise should 
be more capable of detecting the estimation errors and managerial manipulations of fair 
value measurement, and resulting in more informative accounting information. Since fair 
value is expected to outperform historical cost only in predicting short-term ratings, I 
expect the impact auditor industry expertise only applies to a short-term setting. 
Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: Auditor industry expertise increases fair value’s relative short-term debt contracting 
value over historical cost accounting.  
3.3 Research Design  
Consistent with prior accounting and finance literature (e.g., Horrigan, 1996; Glantz and 
Mun, 2008), I use credit ratings to capture banks’ credit risk. Following Fortin and 
Pittman (2007), I convert Moody’s bond ratings to an ordinal scale by assigning numeric 
values to the rating scales. When Moody’s ratings are unavailable I use Standard & 
Poor’s ratings. When neither of the two ratings is available, I use Fitch’s. This 
specification allows me to conserve degrees of freedom and is commonly used in 
previous literature (e.g., Fortin and Pittman, 2007; Cantor, Packer, and Cole, 1997). 
Details of the credit rating classifications are shown in Table 1. Higher credit rating score 
represents higher credit quality, or lower credit risk. 
Insert Table 1 here 
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Prior finance literature identifies a number of accounting-based constructs that determine 
corporate bond ratings (e.g., Horrigan, 1966; Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979; Boardman and 
McEnally, 1981; Lamy and Thompson, 1988; Ziebart and Reiter, 1992). Following 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), I include the following five accounting variables as the 
independent variables in my regression. These constructs are leverage (LEV), return-on-
assets ratio (ROA), interest coverage ratio (COV), a categorical variable set to 1 if the 
firm reports negative income (LOSS), and firm size (SIZE). These five accounting based 
constructs are all used as proxy for firms’ default risk. Higher leverage and lower return 
on asset and interest coverage ratio reflect greater default risk. Loss represents another 
indicator of default risk, because unprofitable firms have higher likelihood of default. 
Larger firms face lower risk, and therefore firm size is expected to be positively 
associated with credit ratings.  Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) provide empirical results that 
these five types of accounting ratios well explain the variance of credit ratings 
(generalized R2 up to 0.82). Table 2 shows the measurement of variables and their 
predicted association with credit ratings.  
Insert Table 2 here 
Similar to Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), my empirical tests are based on ordered logit 
model that captures credit ratings as a function of these five accounting-based variables. 
Ordered logit model is proper for the analysis because the credit rating scores convey 
ordinal risk information. Higher rating scores represent lower credit risk. However, I 
cannot assume uniform differences in risk between the categories. The regression model 
is as follows: 
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RATING = f(LEV, ROA, LOSS, COV, SIZE)                                            (1) 
To examine the relative explanatory power of fair value accounting as opposed to 
historical cost accounting with respect to credit ratings, I construct the above-mentioned 
five accounting measures using fair value and historical cost inputs respectively. For 
example, to get the fair value measure of total assets, I adjust the total assets reported 
under U.S. GAAP (GAAP total assets) by deducting the elements that are reported at 
historical cost and adding the fair values of these elements. Among all the financial 
instruments used in my study, held-to-maturity securities and net loans are reported at 
historical cost. Therefore, the fair value of total assets equals the value of GAAP-based 
total assets minus the historical cost of held-to-maturity securities and net loans plus the 
fair values of these two instruments. Fair value leverage is then calculated by total fair 
value liabilities over total fair value assets. Similarly, in order to get the fair value 
measure of ROA, I adjust the reported income before extraordinary items by deducting 
the difference between the amount reported in the current period and that in the previous 
period (i.e., the unrealized gains or losses) for held-to-maturity securities, net loans, and 
long-term debt measured at historical cost and adding the fair values of the unrealized 
gains or losses for these three items. Then the fair value measure of ROA is the fair value 
adjusted income before extraordinary items over fair value total assets. Similarly, the 
historical cost ROA can be obtained by dividing the historical cost adjusted income 
before extraordinary items by historical cost-based total assets. In the same way, I get all 
the fair value and historical cost measures of the five accounting variables. Using these 
measures, I run horse-race tests and compare the generalized R2 of equation 2 and that of 
equation 3. A greater generalized R2 indicates greater debt contracting value. 
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RATING = f(LEV_HC, ROA_HC, LOSS_HC, COV_HC, SIZE_HC)                           (2) 
RATING = f(LEV_FV, ROA_FV, LOSS_FV, COV_FV, SIZE_FV)                           (3) 
Furthermore, to examine whether auditor industry expertise plays a role in improving fair 
value accounting’s debt contracting value, I test the relative explanatory power of fair 
value accounting as opposed to historical cost accounting in explaining credit ratings by 
dividing the sample into two groups: auditor-expert group and non-auditor-expert group. 
Following prior auditing literature (e.g., Ferguson, Francis and Stokes, 2003; Hogan and 
Jeter, 1999; Reichelt and Wang, 2010), I measure national level auditor industry expertise 
based on the auditor’s annual market share of audit fees within two-digit SIC category (in 
particular in my study, SIC=60). Table 3 shows the percentage of market share of audit 
fees by auditor and year. From 2003 to 2007, KPMG is the sole banking industry leader 
in terms of its shares of audit fees. However, from 2008 to 2010, both KPMG and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers are identified as having banking industry expertise. The 
statistics are consistent with prior auditing literature that KPMG is dominant in providing 
audit services to the banks.  
Insert Table 3 here 
3.4 Sample Selection and Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Sample Selection 
I focus on the U.S. bank holding companies with available credit ratings. Table 4 
delineates the sample selection process. Sample firms are initially identified from the 
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SNL Financial database6. To be included in the sample, firms need to have at least one 
credit rating issued by one of the top 3 rating agencies, i.e., Moody’s, Standard and 
Poor’s and Fitch during the years 2003-2012. 2003 is determined as the beginning year of 
the sample because fair value measurements were sparkled before 2002. To avoid the 
confounding effect, I avoid multiple ratings issued by different ratings agencies for the 
same firm at a specific data point. To do this, I start by including all credit ratings of U.S. 
bank holding companies issued by Moody’s. I complement this sample by adding credit 
ratings issued by Standard and Poor’s that are unique firm-quarter observations. I apply 
the same rationale to add observations from Fitch. This process yields 1877 unique credit 
ratings by the three rating agencies. I also extract from the SNL database and 
complement by manual collection from annual reports both the fair values and the 
historical cost of the five financial instruments (i.e., available-for-sale securities, held-to-
maturity securities, net loans, total deposits and long-term debt) for the firms in the initial 
sample. I merge the resulting data with the original sample requiring that both measures, 
i.e., fair value and historical cost, for all financial instruments be available. This process 
reduces the sample to 1524 observations. Since short-term credit risk differs in nature 
from long-term credit risk, I construct subsamples of short-term ratings and long-term 
ratings. The short-term credit rating group contains 898 observations and the long-term 
credit rating group contains 626 observations. I also examine the impact of auditor 
industry expertise on the debt contracting value of fair value accounting numbers. To 
accomplish this, I further divide the short-term credit rating sample into industry-
                                                             
6 SNL Financial database provides a wide converge of financial data of Banking, Insurance, Financial 
Services, Real Estate, Energy and Media & Communications. 
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specialized auditor group (n=173) and non-industry-specialized auditor group (n=686), 
while deleting the observations with no auditor information.  
Insert Table 4 here 
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 5 provides descriptive statistics on the fair value and historical cost-
based accounting variables. Panel B-D of Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for 
short-term credit ratings, audit-short-term ratings, non-audit-expert-short-term ratings and 
long-term rating subsamples. Overall, there is no severe skewness or significant outliers 
in my samples. Compared with firms in non-banking industries, bank holding companies 
exhibit higher leverage, more volatile return on assets, greater likelihood of loss, and 
greater size. Besides, comparing the fair value and historical cost measures of return on 
assets and loss, I find that on average, fair value makes earnings more volatile as opposed 
to the historical cost equivalents. 
Insert Table 5 here 
3.4.3 Correlation Matrix 
Panel A to E of Table 6 show the correlation tables of test variables. The upper triangle 
shows the Spearman correlation and the lower triangle shows the Pearson correlation. 
Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006), credit rating score is 
positively associated with ROA, interest coverage, and size, and negatively associated 
with leverage and loss at conventional significance level. In addition, the fair value and 
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historical cost measures of the same variable do not show exceptionally high correlation, 
implying that the two types of accounting information has different information content.  
Insert Table 6 here 
3.4.4 Empirical Results 
In order to test fair value’s relative short-term debt contracting value, I run the horse race 
tests using the short-term credit ratings sample. Table 7 Panel A shows the results. As is 
consistent with my first hypothesis, the generalized R2 for historical cost model is 0.3689, 
while that of fair value model is 0.5525, and this difference is significant (z=-4.4023, 
p<0.0001) using Vuong (1989)’s test statistics. This result shows that fair value 
accounting has greater short-term debt contracting value than historical cost accounting. 
An explanation for this evidence is that firms’ short-term credit risk is directly associated 
with the current value of firms’ assets and liabilities. In terms of an immediate default, it 
is the difference between fair value assets and fair value liabilities that debtholders can 
claim. On the contrary, under such circumstances, historical cost may be distorting in 
presenting the values of debtholder claims. That explains why fair value accounting has 
more short-term debt contracting value than historical cost accounting. In addition, the 
coefficients for all five accounting variables are significant at the conventional levels, 
except the coefficient for leverage measured at historical cost. One possible explanatory 
is that leverage measures the company’s overall capitalization status encompassing both 
the short-term and long-term liabilities. In addition, as opponents of historical cost 
accounting claim, historical cost numbers provide distorted information to investors 
because they do not reflect the changes in values of assets and liabilities in a timely 
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manner. However, since the focus of this study is to compare the relative explanatory 
power of historical cost and fair value in predicting firms’ credit ratings, the magnitude 
and the significance of the coefficients of the independent variables are not my main 
concern. 
In order to test fair value’s relative long-term debt contracting value, I run the horse race 
tests using the long-term credit ratings sample, and the results are presented in Panel B of 
Table 7. Results show that fair value accounting ratios do not better capture credit risks 
than historical cost accounting (Vuong’s Z=0.1975). This evidence is consistent with fair 
value’s inability to predict long-term values because it is based on volatile market values 
with little persistence in nature. The reason why historical cost does not significantly 
outperform fair value in predicting banks’ credit risks may be the lack of relevance of 
historical cost-based accounting numbers. 
Insert Table 7 here 
Next, I examine the third hypothesis that the relative debt contracting value of fair value 
accounting numbers is conditional on whether or not a firm hires industry-expert auditors. 
Table 8 presents the impact of auditor industry expertise on fair value’s short-term debt 
contracting value. In the auditor-industry-expert group, fair value accounting ratios 
outperform historical cost accounting ratios in explaining credit ratings (the generalized 
R2 of fair value and historical cost are 0.3655 and 0.2356). This result is consistent with 
the role of auditors, especially those with industry expertise, in improving the reliability 
of accounting numbers in the financial statements. On the contrary, in the non-expert 
group, historical cost accounting numbers outperform fair value accounting numbers (the 
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generalized R2 of fair value and historical cost are 0.4434 and 0.5872). This finding 
suggests that auditors without industry expertise do not provide assurance regarding the 
reliability of accounting numbers, since they are less capable in detecting estimation 
errors and opportunistic manipulation of fair value measures. Similar tests on long-term 
credit ratings are lack of power (untabulated) due to insufficient number of observations 
in the auditor expert group (n=69). 
Insert Table 8 here 
3.5 Robustness Checks 
In this section, I conduct a battery of sensitivity analyses to ensure the robustness of my 
empirical results.  
3.5.1 Bootstrap as an alternative method 
Instead of comparing the goodness of fit of the ordered logit models, I use bootstrap as an 
alternative methodology to test the relative predicting power of fair value versus 
historical cost in predicting credit ratings. Bootstrap methods are frequently used in 
simulations to calculate standard errors, confidence intervals, and significance tests 
(David and Hinkley, 1997). Here I compare the estimation errors of predicting credit 
ratings using fair value and historical cost method. I replicate the bootstrap samples for 
1,000 times and calculate the mean of the mean squares of residuals resulting from 
regressing credit ratings on fair value accounting ratios and historical cost accounting 
ratios respectively. For the short-term credit ratings sample, the average square of 
residuals based on fair value ratios is 0.61, and that on historical costs is 0.43. For the 
long-term credit ratings sample, the average square of residuals based on fair value ratios 
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is 0.51, and on historical costs is 0.55. That is to say, fair value measurements outperform 
historical cost in predicting short-term credit ratings, rather than in predicting long-term 
credit rating.  These results are consistent with the findings in the prior sections.   
3.5.2 Alternative Empirical Proxies 
I use common alternatives of the independent variables to check whether my results are 
robust to different proxies of the accounting ratios. Specifically, following Philips (1975) 
and Ross (1976), I use long-term debt/total assets as the proxy for leverage, and the 
results, shown in Table 9, Proxy (1), are consistent with my prior findings. Besides, I use 
cash flow before interest and taxes/total debt as an alternative proxy for interest coverage 
(Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979). Results reported in Proxy (2) of Table 9 indicate that my 
main empirical findings are robust. Furthermore, I use the total market capitalization as 
proxy for firm size (see, Atiase, 1985), and the results, reported in Proxy (3) of Table 9, 
are also consistent with my main findings. In addition, according to DBRS Rating Report 
(2011), efficiency ratio is also used as an important determinant for the credit ratings of 
banks. This ratio is measured as the non-interest expense of the banks divided by 
operating revenue. It reflects a bank’s ability to effectively manage cost and contributes 
to the bank’ resilient earnings power (DBRS Rating Report, 2011). Since both interest 
coverage ratio and the efficiency ratio capture the risk of the companies to hold debt, and 
the two measures are highly correlated. I replace the interest coverage ratio by the 
efficiency ratio and my results remain robust (see Proxy (4) of Table 9). 
Insert Table 9 here 
3.5.3 Possible omitted independent variables 
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I add variables that are commonly used by rating agencies to establish rating levels for 
banks (e.g., Moody’s Investors Services, 2006 and DBRS Rating Report, 2011) in the 
regression.  Specifically, I add revenues of the largest business segment scaled by total 
assets of the company, number of business segments and the cash flows from operations 
divided by total debt as additional explanatory variables. The revenues of the largest 
business segment over total assets and number of business segments are proxies for 
diversification of operations. Cash flows from operations divided by total debt measures 
liquidity strength of the companies as a signal of their ability to service the debt. These 
three variables are used in Ball et al. (2008) as additional factors that affect the debt 
contracting value of accounting information. The untabulated results of this specification 
do not violate the prior findings.  
Besides, following West (1970), I add earnings variability as additional explanatory 
variables in the regression. I use systematic accounting risk measure and unsystematic 
accounting risk measure to proxy for earnings variability. The systematic risk of the firms’ 
common stock is estimated as the standard error of the residual in the model with firm-
specific earnings as the dependent variable and market annual income as the independent 
variables. The unsystematic risk is estimated using the market beta for each firm. This 
process does not alter my empirical results. 
In addition, I add year dummies in the regression as a control for macro-economic factors 
that might affect credit ratings. According to Willson (1997a, b), macro-economic factors, 
such as GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, long-term interest rates, foreign exchange 
rates and aggregate saving rates, have impact on firms’ default risk. The year dummy can 
capture the macro-economic factor in a specific year. Results are robust after adding the 
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year dummy. Note that in my main regressions, I use horse-race tests to compare the 
relative debt contracting value of fair value and historical cost. While the five accounting 
numbers differ under the two measurement systems, the economic factor is the same for 
every firm-quarter observation. Therefore, the omitted macro-economic factor does not 
affect the relative explanatory power of the two types of accounting information in 
explaining credit ratings, given the independence of the two variables. As a result, it is 
not surprising to see my results (untabulated) are robust after adding the year dummies. 
3.5.4 Model Specification 
As is shown in the correlation matrix of the test variables, LOSS and ROA exhibit high 
correlations. Highly correlated independent variables lead to misspecification of the 
model. Since both Loss and ROA capture the attributes of earnings, I delete LOSS and use 
ROA as the sole indicator of firms’ earnings attributes. The results are shown in Table 10 
Panel A and B. This specification does not change the main findings.  
Insert Table 10 here 
3.6 Synthesis  
In this chapter, I investigate the debt contracting value of fair value accounting 
information. Specifically, I examine fair value accounting’s relative explanatory power as 
opposed to that of historical cost accounting in explaining firms’ credit ratings. I find that 
fair value accounting has greater explanatory power in explaining short-term credit 
ratings than historical cost accounting. However, I do not find the same result for long-
term credit ratings. This finding is consistent with Plantin et al.’s (2008) prediction that 
fair value does not work well for long-lived assets. In addition, I examine the impact of 
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auditor industry expertise on the relative debt contracting value of fair value accounting. 
Empirical results show that auditor industry expertise improves fair value’s decision 
usefulness to debtholders since they serve as good monitoring mechanisms to constrain 
the managerial opportunism and/or estimation errors that fair value accounting is prone to 
have.  
An important contribution of my analysis is to more directly connect the existence of 
unresolved information asymmetries with direct measures of the debt contracting value of 
both fair value-based and historical cost-based accounting information. This allows me to 
provide textured evidence on the central role of accounting information in reflecting 
firms’ credit risk. Second, according to Plantin et al. (2008), the choice of an accounting 
measurement regime for financial institutions is one of the most contentious policy issues 
facing financial regulators and accounting standard setters at the moment. While the fair 
value debate has been on for over two decades, there has been mixed results as to 
whether fair value or historical cost makes the disclosure regimes better. I empirically 
document that fair value accounting information outperforms historical cost accounting 
information in reflecting firms’ short-term credit risk but underperforms historical cost 
accounting in reflecting firms’ long-term credit risk. This finding helps to disentangle the 
mixed results by providing the scenarios when fair value accounting is more informative 
of firms’ credit risk than historical cost accounting and vice versa.  
The research design in this chapter also has some limitations. First, to test the impact of 
fair value on credit ratings, it would be more interesting to use the change of credit 
ratings as the dependent variable for the logit model. However, due to the fact that the 
change analysis requires stricter criteria for an observation to be selected in the sample 
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(i.e., the historical costs and fair values of the five financial instruments need to be 
available for two consecutive years, and the credit ratings need to be available for two 
consecutive years with a one year lag with the financial data), I cannot get decent sample 
size to run regression for the change analysis. Second, since the fair value and historical 
cost data for the financial instruments are retrieved from either the main body or the 
footnotes of the financial statement, the difference in the impacts of the two measures 
may also be driven by the difference between measurement versus recognition. For 
example, if a certain financial instrument is measured at historical cost in the main body 
of the statement, and the fair value of this instrument is disclosed in the footnote, the 
results that historical cost is taken into consideration when deciding a firm's credit ratings 
may not be due to the fact that historical cost is superior, it may just because historical 
cost is the one that is disclosed in the main body. I cannot control for this alternate 
explanation using my current methodology. 
Chapter 4 Fair Value Accounting and the Cost of Debt 
4.1 Hypothesis Development 
4.1.1 Aggregate Fair Value and the Cost of Debt 
Due to the existence of underinvestment problems and asset substitution risks (Myers, 
1977; Smith and Warner, 1979), uninformed creditors face a form of systematic 
information risk. As a result, these creditors will charge a higher cost of capital as 
compensation (Francis et al., 2005). There are two lines of theories that support the 
association between the informativeness of accounting numbers and firms’ cost of capital. 
Easley and O’Hara (2004) argue that high quality accounting information decreases the 
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(information-based) systematic risk to uninformed investors. As a result, investors 
demand a lower risk premium; i.e., a lower cost of capital. By contrast, Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2007) consider the role of financial reporting in aligning firms and investors 
with respect to firms’ capital investment decisions. High-quality financial reporting 
decreases managers’ motivation to invest in risky projects, therefore investors face lower 
risk and charge a lower cost of capital.    
In short, both Easley and O’Hara (2004) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2007) predict a 
positive association between firms’ information risk and cost of capital. The information 
risk can be alleviated if creditors have access to timely and informative accounting 
information (Sengupta, 1998). According to Smith and Warner (1979), accounting 
numbers have been used in lending agreements and debt covenants for hundreds of years. 
Accounting-based numbers serve as a useful tool for creditors to assess firm health and 
viability (Anderson et al., 2004). Therefore, by reducing investors’ information risk, 
decision useful accounting information leads to lower cost of capital. 
Fair value is a double-edged sword in terms of its decision usefulness to financial 
statement users. As previously mentioned, decision usefulness is defined with respect to 
the relevance, reliability, comparability and understandability of accounting information 
(Spiceland et al., 2005). On the one hand, fair value is more relevant in that it provides 
timely update regarding the company’s financial position (Emerson et al., 2010), sending 
early signals of deterioration and allowing prompt corrective actions if necessary 
(Linsmeier, 2011); fair value is also conceptually more reliable because, by definition, 
market-based numbers are free from manipulation; fair value numbers, or market-based 
accounting numbers are more comparable across firms; and the exit value concept of fair 
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value is more understandable than applying the complex hedge accounting. On the other 
hand, however, some fair value inputs (i.e., Level 2 and Level 3 inputs) are based on 
estimation and managerial discretion. As a result, these fair value inputs are subject to 
low reliability (Emerson et al, 2010). Besides, once fair values involve discretion and/or 
estimation errors, their comparability and understandability are called into question. 
Therefore, it is an open question whether more use of fair values in the financial 
statements improves or decreases the decision usefulness of accounting information. As a 
result, I state my first hypothesis in null form: 
H1: There is no difference in the cost of debt of firms with more use of fair values and 
firms with less use of fair values. 
4.1.2 Distinguishing among the Fair Value Hierarchies 
Because active markets do not exist for all items on the financial statement, in order to 
measure fair values in all scenarios, the fair value inputs are divided into three hierarchies: 
Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 fair value inputs.  
Based on the definition in SFAS 157 (FASB, 2006a), Level 1 fair value inputs are the 
unadjusted quoted prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities at the 
measurement date. The pure market-based inputs timely reflect firms’ financial condition, 
and are free from manipulation and estimation errors. Besides, the market values of the 
same assets or liabilities are the same across firms. In addition, understanding the values 
of the Level 1 inputs requires no specific knowledge. That is to say, Level 1 fair value 
inputs are highly relevant, reliable, comparable and understandable, thus highly decision 
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useful. Therefore, the use of Level 1 inputs in the financial statements helps reduce the 
information risk that creditors face, resulting in lower cost of debt.  
Based on the above analysis, I state my second hypothesis as follows: 
H2a: Firms with more Level 1 fair value inputs in the financial statements have lower 
cost of debt. 
Level 2 inputs are either quoted prices of identical assets or liabilities in inactive markets 
or quoted prices of similar items in active or inactive markets (FASB, 2006a). That is, the 
determination of the amount of Level 2 inputs is mainly market-based. However, 
management has the discretion in determining which is the “similar item” for price 
matching purposes, making Level 2 fair values subject to low reliability. Therefore, it is 
an empirical question whether the use of Level 2 fair values improves or undermines the 
decision-usefulness of accounting information, and thus increases or decreases firms’ 
cost of debt. As a result, I propose the following hypothesis in null form:  
H2b: There is no difference in cost of debt between firms with more use of Level 2 fair 
values and less use of Level 2 fair values.  
The determination of Level 3 inputs is more discretionary. Level 3 inputs are 
characterized as unobservable data and are used where observable market inputs are not 
available. Level 3 inputs are the most problematic among the three tiers of fair value 
inputs. The determination of the unobservable inputs involves the company’s own 
understanding about the assumptions market participants would use in pricing the asset, 
indicating that the reliability, comparability and understandability of Level 3 inputs are 
called into question. Therefore, the use of Level 3 inputs in the financial statements may 
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even exacerbate the information risk of debtholders, resulting in higher cost of debt. 
Therefore, my third hypothesis goes as follows: 
H2c: Firms with more Level 3 fair value inputs have higher cost of debt. 
As previously analyzed, there is difference in nature across the three levels of fair value 
measurement. Level 1 fair value is a pure market-based measurement, which is not 
subject to reliability issues. Therefore, the decision-usefulness of Level 1 fair value inputs 
should be the greatest among the three tiers. Level 2 fair values involve certain extent of 
estimation and allows for leeway for managerial manipulation. Thus, compared with 
Level 1 fair values, the decision-usefulness of Level 2 fair values should decrease. At the 
other end of the spectrum, Level 3 fair values are completely based on models, leaving 
the greatest room for manipulation and making the measurement vulnerable to estimation 
errors. As the reliability of the three levels of fair value decreases from Level 1 to Level 3, 
I expect that firms’ cost of debt increases accordingly. This analysis leads to my 
Hypothesis 2d: 
H2d: Firms’ cost of debt increases as the level of fair value measurement increases.  
4.1.3 Auditor Industry Expertise and the Impact of Fair Value on Cost of Debt 
Fair value accounting information is less reliable when the fair value inputs are based on 
management’s judgment and estimation. Prior auditing literature documents the 
effectiveness of auditor industry expertise in improving the reliability of accounting 
numbers (e.g., Bedard and Biggs, 1991; Johnson et al., 1991; Wright and Wright, 1997; 
Balsam et al, 2003; Krishnan, 2003). Specifically, Bedard and Biggs (1991) find that 
auditors with more industry specific experience are better able to identify errors in the 
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data of clients in that industry. Similarly, Johnson et al. (1991) show that industry 
experience is associated with enhanced ability to detect fraud. Wright and Wright (1997) 
observe that significant experience in the retailing industry improves auditor’s ability to 
identify material errors.  
Auditors’ industry expertise improves the reliability of reported accounting numbers in 
two ways. First, auditors with industry expertise have more industry-specific knowledge 
in detecting the errors in the financial statements. Specialist auditors are likely to invest 
more in a specific industry in staff training, experience sharing, and state-of-the-art audit 
technologies than nonspecialist auditors (Dopuch and Simunic, 1982). Both training and 
experience increase the auditor’s domain knowledge of a specific industry, and 
specialized industry knowledge reduces errors in judgment (Solomon et al., 1999). As 
error characteristics and methods of detection are different across industries (Maletta and 
Wright, 1996), industry-specialized auditors are better able to understand not only the 
valuation models and the management processes that determine the fair value model 
inputs, but also management’s potential biases and likely errors when applying models, 
identifying market inputs and making assumptions (Martin et al., 2008). Therefore, firms 
audited by industry specialists would benefit more by using fair value-based accounting 
numbers, because the relevance of financial reporting is improved while the reliability is 
also assured. 
Second, auditors with industry expertise also have incentive to conduct high-quality 
auditing to protect their reputation. It is costly to build up a brand-name reputation as a 
specialist in a specific industry. Therefore, specialist auditors have greater incentive to 
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report questionable fair value accounting numbers, because they have more to lose in the 
event of audit failure.  
The above analysis leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3a: Auditor industry expertise lowers the cost of debt for firms that use fair value 
accounting.  
As previously discussed, Level 1 and Level 2 fair value inputs are both based on market 
prices, and understanding these inputs does not require specific knowledge. Therefore, 
debtholders do not rely on specialized auditors to provide safeguard regarding the 
reliability of the fair value inputs. However, Level 3 fair value inputs may involve 
estimation errors and managerial manipulations. Industry specialized auditors have the 
specific knowledge to discover the problems of the Level 3 fair value inputs if there is 
any. Therefore, the impact of auditor industry expertise on firms’ cost of debt should only 
apply to firms with Level 3 fair value inputs in the financial statements. Based on these 
analyses, I put forward the following hypothesis: 
H3b: Auditor industry expertise lowers the cost of debt only for firms with usage of 
Level 3 fair value inputs.  
4.2 Research Design 
4.2.1 Sample Selection 
Table 11 describes the sample selection process. The initial sample selection begins by 
downloading from SNL Financial Capital Offering database a list bond specific data of 
all new bonds issued from January 1, 2008 to April 30, 2012. Year 2008 is determined as 
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the starting year for the bond data because fair value accounting data become available 
since 2007 and I require a one-year lag for yield spread to respond to financial statement 
data. April 30, 2012 is the most recent bond issue data available at the SNL database. 
This step yields an initial sample of 589 bonds with issue-specific data. 
I then collect credit ratings, fair value and firm-specific data for the period between from 
SNL Financial Companies database during the period 2007-2011. I first merge fair value 
data with credit ratings data and get 252 observations of fair value-rating data. I then 
obtain audit fee data from AuditAnalytic database in order to get the auditor industry 
expertise measure. All 252 firm-year observations have auditor information at 
AuditAnalytic database. So the new sample with fair value, credit rating and auditor 
expertise information still has 252 observations. I further merge this new dataset with the 
bond data and the sample is reduced from 589 to 376 observations.  
Insert Table 11 here 
4.2.2 Empirical Models 
Based on prior debt literature (Mansi et al., 2004; Anderson et al., 2004; Fortin and 
Pittman, 2007), I use a two-stage model to test the impact of fair value accounting 
numbers on firms’ cost of debt. Use of fair value can affect a firm’s cost of debt either 
through its impact on credit ratings or through its direct impact on cost of debt by 
reducing the information asymmetry and agency problems. I first examine the effect of 
use of fair value on credit ratings. Credit ratings agencies provide independent 
assessments of the credit quality of the firms based on their professional knowledge in 
interpreting firms’ financial information. If fair value accounting improves the 
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information quality of financial reporting, I expect the use of fair value accounting 
numbers to be significantly related to credit ratings. To test this hypothesis, I estimate the 
following firm-level regression model: 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+ 𝛾0,…,5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                           (1) 
The above regression tests the impact of fair value accounting on credit ratings. The 
residual of the regression, denoted as OrthRating, captures the portion of credit ratings 
that is not driven by fair value and other control variables. I follow Mansi et al. (2004) 
and include OrthRating in the regression model of cost of debt, in which fair value is the 
test variable. I also control for issue level and firm level determinants of cost of debt.  
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑂𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0,…,5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡          (2) 
In order to test the different impact of three levels of fair value inputs, I divide the fair 
value measures based on the three-level hierarchy, Level1, Level2 and Level3, and replace 
them as the test variables in the regression model.  
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑂𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙2𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙3𝑖𝑡+𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0,…,5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                (3) 
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In order to test whether the impact of Level 1 fair value measurement is different from 
Level 2, I restructure the above regression model as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑂𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙1𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙2𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙2𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙3𝑖𝑡+𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0,…,5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                (4) 
A result that coefficient α3 = 0  indicates that Level 1 and Level 2 fair value 
measurement has the same impact on yield spread. A positive coefficient (α3 > 0) is 
consistent with \Hypothesis 2d that when moving from Level 1 to Level 2 fair value 
measurement, firms’ cost of debt increases.   
Similarly, a positive coefficient of Level 3 (α4 > 0) in Model (5) is consistent with 
Hypothesis 2d that as fair value measurement moves from Level 2 to Level 3, firms’ cost 
of debt increases. 
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑂𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙2𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙3𝑖𝑡)+ 𝛼4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙3𝑖𝑡+𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0,…,5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                (5) 
Auditor industry expertise has both a direct and an indirect impact on firms’ cost of debt. 
First, generally speaking, the presence of an industry specialist alleviates the information 
asymmetry and agency cost of debt, therefore debtholders charge a lower cost. Second, 
for firms that measure assets and liabilities at fair value, auditor industry expertise 
improves the reliability of fair value accounting inputs, which leads to an indirect impact 
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on a lower cost of debt. Therefore, I include Specialist and interaction of Specialist and 
FairValue as additional test variables in the regression models. The focus of Hypotheses 
3a and 3b is the interaction terms. 
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑂𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼4𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0,…,5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                (6) 
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑂𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙2𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙3𝑖𝑡+𝛼5𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙1𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙2𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+𝛼8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙3𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡+  𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0,…,5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                (7) 
4.2.3 Measurement of Variable 
In specifying Rating, the dependent variable in Model (1), I convert Moody’s, Standard 
& Poor’s and Fitch long-term bond rating symbols to an ordinal scale by assigning a 
value of 1 to the lowest rating, 2 to the second lowest rating, etc. I average all ratings 
issued by Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch by firm and year in order to get the 
average firm-year Rating variable, because a number of the bonds in my sample have 
multiple ratings. 
YieldSpread is a common proxy for cost of debt (e.g., Fortin and Pittman, 2007; Fenn, 
2000; Livingston and Zhou, 2002; and Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2004) and is the 
dependent variable in Model (2). It is defined as the difference in basis points between 
the at-issue yield to maturity on the corporate bond and that of a U.S. treasury bond 
issued on the same date with comparable maturity.  
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My primary test variable, FairValue, is the percentage of assets and liabilities measured 
at fair value in the balance sheet over total assets reported in the balance sheet of the 
same year. It measures how much fair value is used for the assets and liabilities in the 
financial statements. Level1 (Level2 or Level3) is the percentage of Level 1 (Level 2 or 
Level 3) fair value assets and Level 1 (Level 2 or Level 3) fair value liabilities over total 
assets. I control for other issue-level and firm-level determinants of debt pricing in my 
model following prior debt pricing literature. In the next section, I explain the predicted 
influence of these control variables on at-issue yield spreads. The predictions for ratings 
generally go in the opposite direction. 
Issue-Level Control Variables 
I assign the dummy variable, Underwriter, a value of 1 if the debt is issued by an 
underwriter and 0 otherwise. According to Fernando et al. (2003), the presence of an 
underwriter is associated with issuers of higher credit quality. Therefore, I expect that 
yield spreads is negatively associated with Underwriter. Maturity is the natural logarithm 
of 1 plus the issue’s years to maturity. I predict that yield spread is decreasing in Maturity, 
because less risky firms tend to issue longer maturity bonds (Duffie and Lando, 2001 and 
Yu, 2005). IssueSize is the natural logarithm of the issue proceeds. I expect an inverse 
relation between IssueSize and cost of debt, because larger issues are more liquid due to 
the fact that they attract more investor interest and secondary market trading (Fenn, 2000 
and Yu, 2005). Convertible is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bond is 
convertible and 0 otherwise. Convertible bonds are expected to have a lower cost of debt 
because it mitigates the agency cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998). Finally, I include the year 
dummies to reflect the changing macroeconomic conditions during my sample period. 
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Firm-Level Control Variables 
I predict that firms’ yield spreads is increasing in their Leverage, which is measured as 
total liabilities scaled by total assets at the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the 
corporate bond issuance date. Based on Jensen and Meckling (1976), high leverage 
causes agency problems by generating incentives for risk shifting and asset substitution. I 
also include interest coverage, InterestCov, in my debt-pricing regression. It is defined as 
income before extraordinary items divided by interest expense for the year immediately 
prior to the bond issuance date. Better InterestCov is expected to be associated with lower 
cost of debt, because firms that generate more cash internally are in better position to 
service their debts (Pittman and Fortin, 2004). IssuerSize is measured as the natural log of 
an issuer’s assets at the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to the corporate bond 
issuance date. Issuers with larger assets are less risky compared with those with smaller 
assets. Hence, it is expected to be negatively related to yield spread. ROA is the return on 
assets of the issuers, defined as the net income divided by total assets at the end of the 
fiscal year immediately prior to the corporate bond issuance date. A higher ROA 
generally indicates greater profitability and is thus expected to be negatively associated 
with yield spread. Loss is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm’s ROA is 
negative and 0 otherwise. Loss is expected to be positively associated with yield spread. 
Auditor Industry Expertise 
Following prior auditing literature, auditor industry expertise is based on the auditor’s 
annual market share of audit fees within a two-digit SIC category (see Ferguson et al., 
2003; Hogan and Jeter, 1999, Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003; Reichelt and Wang, 2010). An 
  63 
auditor is defined as industry specialist if in a particular year the auditor has the largest 
market share in a two-digit SIC category and if its market share is at least 10% points 
greater than the second largest industry leader in the audit market. The variable Specialist 
is a dummy variable that has the value of 1 if an auditor has industry expertise, and 0 
otherwise.  
4.3 Empirical Results 
4.3.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 12 provides descriptive statistics of the regression variables for the rating sample 
and the yield spread sample. The sample period for both samples is 2007-2011. Panel A 
presents the statistics of continuous and discrete variables and Panel B shows the 
statistics of dummy variables. Overall, there is good variation across all continuous 
variables except Leverage. Financial institutions are generally highly levered due to their 
nature of business. Therefore, the mean (0.898) and median (0.896) of Leverage are 
much higher and the standard deviation (0.019) is much lower than those reported in 
other industries. The rating sample has only firm-level variables, while the yield spread 
sample is composed of both issue-level and firm-level control variables. Panel A shows 
that the average of yield spread is 3.05%, with a standard deviation of 2.24%. The 
average of total assets and liabilities measured at fair value, FairValue, is 89.13% and the 
standard deviation is 0.74. The averages of fair value breakdowns, i.e., Level1, Level2 
and Level3, are 7.59% (2.09%), 76.78% (27.91%) and 6.50% (2.00%) in the yield spread 
(rating) sample, indicating that most of the fair value inputs are measured at Level 2 
during the sample period. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of discrete variables.  
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24.6% of the firms in the rating sample experienced loss. In the yield spread sample, 47.5% 
of auditors are banking industry experts in the yield spread sample. 32.45% of the bonds 
have underwriters. Only 5% of the bonds issued in the yield spread sample have 
convertible features.  
Insert Table 12 here 
Table 13 Panel A and B present the Pearson correlations of the variables in the rating 
sample and the yield spread sample respectively. Panel A of Table 13 shows that credit 
rating is positively and significantly associated with the use of total fair value (FairValue) 
and its first two levels of the breakdowns (Level1 and Level2). However, the association 
between Level 3 fair values and credit ratings is not significant. It seems that credit rating 
agencies do not perceive Level 3 fair value inputs informative. The correlations in Panel 
B of Table 13 support the argument that use of fair value lowers firm cost of debt related 
to Hypothesis 1 and are consistent with Hypothesis 2a. The use of fair value (FairValue) 
is significantly associated with lower cost of debt (yieldspread). Besides, the more assets 
and liabilities measured at Level 1 and Level 2 fair values (Level1, Level2), the lower the 
yield spread. Existence of auditor industry expert lowers the borrowing cost, as is 
supported by a significantly negative association between yield spread and auditor 
industry expertise. Furthermore, as is consistent with prior finance and accounting 
literature, the coefficients of underwriter, maturity, issue size, convertible debt, leverage, 
interest coverage are negative, and the coefficient of loss is positive.  
Insert Table 13 here 
4.3.2 Multivariate Analysis 
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Credit rating specifications 
The use of fair value in the financial statements can affect yield spread either (1) through 
its impact on credit ratings or (2) through their marginal impact on cost of debt. Similar 
to Mansi et al. (2004), Anderson et al. (2004), and Pittman and Fortin (2007), I examine 
the impact of fair value on firms’ cost of debt by isolating the impact of fair value on 
credit ratings.  
To test the association between fair value and credit ratings, I regress fair value 
breakdowns and firm-level control variables on firm-year credit rating scores. Table 14 
reports the results. The coefficient of FairValue is significantly positive (3.58; p=0.0004), 
indicating that credit rating agencies perceive the use of fair values favourably. The 
coefficient of auditor industry expertise (-0.45; p=0.1068) is not significant at 
conventional levels, suggesting that the presence of industry specialized auditor does not 
improve the credit ratings. In fact, all the banks in my sample are audited by Big 4 
auditors. Probably credit ratings agencies do not distinguish industry expert and view all 
Big 4 auditors the same as providing the same level of assurance regarding the quality of 
financial reporting. Leverage, return on assets and firm size are all significantly 
associated with credit rating scores as predicted. The residual of this regression, 
OrthRating, represents the portion of credit ratings that is not explained by fair value and 
other control variables. It is included as a control variable in the yield spread-fair value 
regression model. 
Insert Table 14 here 
Fair Value and Yield Spread 
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Table 15 summarizes the OLS regression results with yield spread as a proxy for firm’s 
cost of debt. Equation (2) is the regression model to test the first hypothesis, in which I 
regress fair value, issue-level control variables and firm-level control variables on 
corporate bond’s yield spread. The coefficient of FairValue is significantly negative (-
0.23; p<0.001). The standard deviation of FairValue measure is 0.11, it suggests that on 
average, one standard deviation increase in the use of fair value percentage will result in 
an decrease of 2.5 (23*0.11) basis point of firms’ yield spread. The negative coefficient 
supports the argument that use of fair value lowers firm cost of debt related to Hypothesis 
1. That is to say, generally, the use of fair value accounting numbers is perceived to be 
more decision-useful to debtholders. 
Most of the control variables have the expected signs for their coefficients. For the issue-
level controls, the coefficient for underwriter is negative (-1.12; p<0.001), meaning that 
debt issued with an underwriter has lower costs. The coefficient of maturity is negative (-
0.81; p=0.02), indicating that firms with longer term borrowing has lower cost of debt, 
because these firms are of higher quality. Larger issues are associated with lower yield 
spread (-0.86; p<0.001). For the firm-level controls, firms with higher leverage have 
higher yield spread (11.88; p<0.1). The coefficients of interest coverage, issuer size and 
ROA are all negative (-0.05, -0.53, and -1.73; p<0.001). 
Equation (3) is the regression model to test Hypothesis 2a and 2b, in which the test 
variables are the breakdowns of fair value: Level1, Level2 and Level3. The coefficients 
of Level1 and Level2 are significantly negative (-0.59 and -0.02, p<0.001 and p=0.02). 
That is, the greater proportion of Level1 fair values, the lower cost of debt, which support 
both Hypothesis 2a. The coefficient of Level2 is positive (0.02, p=0.08), supporting the 
  67 
argument that Level 2 fair values are associated with lower cost of debt. Results further 
show that Level3 fair values, by contrast, are associated with higher cost of debt, as is 
evidenced by a positive coefficient of Level3 (0.02, p=0.086). This finding is consistent 
with Hypothesis 2c. Moreover, the coefficients of underwriter, maturity, issue size, 
leverage, issuer size and ROA all have the predicted signs. Results further show that the 
coefficients of α3  and α4  in the equivalent models (4) and (5) are both positive, 
supporting Hypothesis 2d. 
Insert Table 15 here 
Table 16 shows the results of the OLS regression for the moderating effect of auditor 
specialists on the association between firms’ use of fair value and yield spread. Model (6) 
shows the results for total fair value percentage and auditor industry expertise. The 
negative coefficient of the interaction between fair value and auditor specialists (-1.26, 
p=0.01) supports Hypothesis 3a. This result indicates that auditor’s industry expertise 
works as a safeguard regarding the reliability of fair value inputs, thereby improving fair 
value’s decision usefulness to debtholders.  
Model (7) reports the results for the regression with fair value breakdowns as tests 
variables. As is consistent with the results in Panel A, the coefficients of Level1 and 
Level2 fair values are negative while that of Level3 is positive. Interestingly, the 
coefficient for the interaction between fair value Level1 (and Level2) and auditor 
industry expertise is not significant, while the coefficient of the interaction between 
Level3 and auditor industry expertise is significantly negative. This result means that the 
presence of industry specialized auditors improves the reliability of only Level3 fair 
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value inputs, resulting in lower information asymmetry and thus lower cost of debt. 
Considering that Level1 and Level2 fair values are already reliable, industry specialists 
do not have a material impact on the improvement of reliability of fair value numbers. 
Based on this result, Hypothesis 3b is also supported.  
Insert Table 16 here 
4.4 Robustness Checks 
In order to test whether empirical results are driven by specific measurement of fair value 
and the breakdowns, I use alternative fair value measures as a robustness check. First, I 
use market capitalization to replace total assets as the denominator of the fair value 
measures. Market value of the firm is also a commonly used proxy for firm size. Table 17 
reports the results of this test, which are consistent with the results in the main 
regressions.  
Insert Table 17 here 
Second, I split fair value into fair value assets and fair value liabilities. Specifically, A1 
(A2 or A3) denotes the portion of total assets that is measured at Level 1 (Level 2 or 
Level 2) fair value, and L1 (L2 or L3) denotes the portion of total liabilities that is 
measured at Level 1 (Level 2 or Level 2) fair value. I re-run the regressions with A1, A2, 
A3, L1, L2 and L3 as the test variables. Table 18 shows the results. The main results still 
hold, as is evidenced by the negative coefficients of Level 1 and Level 2 fair value assets 
and Level 1 fair value liabilities and a positive coefficient of Level 3 fair values. 
However, due to the limited number of firms that report Level 2 and Level 3 fair values, 
the coefficients for these two variables are not significant.  
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Insert Table 18 here 
In the main multivariate analysis, I use the residual of credit rating regression as a firm-
level control variable. The rationale for this treatment is that credit rating is documented 
to be significantly correlated with many firm-level and issue-level control variables, 
resulting in the multi-collinearity problem with biased coefficient estimates. One way to 
deal with this problem is to use the residual control, as is treated in the main analysis, and 
the other is not to use it at all. As a sensitivity test, I exclude credit rating residual as a 
control variable and run the regressions again. The results are reported in Table 19, 
showing that my hypotheses are still robust to this specification. 
Insert Table 19 here 
The descriptive statistic tables indicate that only a small percentage of new bond issues 
have convertible features. Considering that convertible bonds are of different 
characteristics from straight bonds, including convertible features in the regression 
models may not be appropriate (Khurana and Raman, 2003). As a robustness check, I 
delete the new bond issues with convertible feature in the sample and re-run the 
regressions. The main results, reported in Table 20, remain unchanged.  
Insert Table 20 here 
Fair value has been claimed to have impact on the recent financial crisis. As a result, 
debtholders may have different perception regarding fair value during financial crisis. I 
run the regression by excluding the peak crisis period (year=2008) as another robustness 
check. The results are summarized in Table 21, which is consistent with the main 
findings.  
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Insert Table 21 here 
As the largest U.S. banks are said to be too big to fail and often receive subsidy in the 
form of lower cost of debt (Greeley, 2012), the size of the banks may affect fair value’s 
impact on cost of debt. Therefore, as an additional test, I include a mega-bank dummy in 
the yield spread regression models that takes the value of 1 if a bank is one of the five 
largest banks in the U.S7, and 0 otherwise. Results are shown in Table 22, which confirm 
that the impact on cost of debt is not driven by the size of the banks.  
Insert Table 22 here 
The control variables Leverage, ROA, IssuerSize and Interest Coverage are correlated 
with my main test variable FairValue. In order to deal with this multicollinearity problem, 
I isolate the effect of fair value on the control variables by using the orthogonal measures 
of these control variables with fair value. I denote the orthogonal measure of Leverage, 
ROA, IssuerSize and Interest Coverage after isolating the fair value effect as OrthLev, 
OrthROA, OrthSize, and OrthCov. I replace Leverage, ROA, IssuerSize and Interest 
Coverage by these four orthogonal measures and re-run the regressions. The results are 
shown in Table 23, which presents consistent results, although the results for the fair 
value breakdowns are a little weaker than the main results. 
Insert Table 23 here 
4.5 SummarySynthesis 
                                                             
7 The five largest U.S. banks are JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and 
Goldman Sachs, which take about 56 percent of the U.S. economy, according to the Federal Reserve. These 
mega banks are said to be “too big to fail” (Greeley, 2012). 
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This study focuses on the association between use of fair value and the yield spread of 
new bonds issued by bank holding companies. I also examine the association between use 
of different levels of fair value and the yield spread of bond. In addition, I study the 
impact of auditor industry expertise on the above relations. I find evidence that greater 
use of fair value in the financial statement is generally perceived as more decision-useful 
to debtholders. Besides, I document that Level 1 and Level 2 fair value inputs are 
negatively associated with firm yield spread, but Level 3 fair value inputs are positively 
associated with yield spread, indicating that Level 1 and 2 fair values makes accounting 
information more decision-useful, while Level 3 fair values decrease the decision 
usefulness of accounting information. Furthermore, empirical results show that auditor 
industry expertise improves the informativeness of fair value accounting information, 
especially Level 3 inputs, to debtholders. These empirical results are robust to a series of 
sensitivities tests: e.g., use of alternative proxies for fair value, exclusion of credit rating 
control variable, exclusion of convertible bonds in the sample, and controlling the effect 
of current financial crisis.  
This study substantiates the view that the reporting regime (fair value versus historical 
cost) matters in the pricing of the debt. It contributes to the existing literature on the 
following dimensions. First, it extends the fair value literature by providing theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence regarding the decision-usefulness of fair value 
accounting information in the debt market. Prior fair value studies mainly focus on the 
value relevance of fair value accounting information in the perspective of shareholders. 
Second, this study complements the corporate bond literature by using a financial 
reporting attribute that directly relates fair value with bond’s yield spread. Third, this 
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study contributes to the auditing literature by documenting that auditor industry expertise 
plays a moderating role in the impact of fair value on the cost of corporate debt.  
This study also has some limitations. For example, I cannot rule out the possibility of the 
endogeneity problem that it is the bank business models that drives the results of lower 
cost of debt, and this type of bank model happens to use greater fair value. Besides, while 
the model (3) aims to measure the impact of different levels of fair value measurement on 
yield spread, it may also be measuring whether more liquid assets have lower yield 
spread, since the three-tier fair value levels are corresponded with different levels of 
liquidity. In addition, this study may also suffer from the disclosure versus recognition 
issue that is acknowledged as a limitation of methodology used in Chapter 3.  
Chapter 5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The controversial nature of fair value accounting has emerged as a fruitful focus for 
research (e.g., Barth, 1994; Barth et al., 1995; Eccher et al., 1996; Nelson, 1996; Park et 
al., 1999; Khurana and Kim, 2003; Song et al., 2010; Goh et al., 2009; Kolev, 2009). This 
stream of research provides evidence that fair value accounting information is value 
relevant in predicting stock prices. According to Holthausen and Watts (2001), the 
relevance of accounting numbers is different between equity and debt investors. However, 
despite the importance of public bond market for U.S. corporate financing, current 
accounting research, especially fair value accounting research, ignores the effect of 
financial reporting on debt contracting. Kothari et al. (2010) also criticize the narrow 
interpretation of GAAP objective by the value relevance researchers. This dissertation 
complements the fair value accounting literature by examining the impact of fair value 
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accounting on two aspects of debt financing: credit ratings and cost of debt. I also 
investigate the role that auditor industry expertise plays in the association between fair 
value and firms’ debt attributes. The setting I use is the U.S. bank holding industry since 
banks are the reporting entities that are most affected by the advent of fair value 
accounting.  
In Chapter 2, I discuss the institutional background of fair value accounting. Specifically, 
in Section 2.1, I describe the definition of fair value accounting and provide details of its 
measurement rules. In Section 2.2, I discuss the evolution of fair value in accounting 
theory and financial reporting regime. In Section 2.3, I summarize the theoretical analysis 
on the decision usefulness of fair value accounting and review prior literature. Over all, I 
conclude that the controversial nature of fair value accounting makes it an interesting 
question to investigate the impact of fair value on corporate debt financing.  
The two empirical chapters of this dissertation, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, take a 
debtholder’s perspective and examine the relative predicting power of fair value 
accounting numbers in explaining credit ratings and the impact of use of fair value on 
firms’ cost of debt. Accounting measurement regimes have real impact on firms’ 
fundamental. This is so because accounting standard affects bank managers’ decision 
whether to securitize certain portfolio before the reporting date, so that the reported 
accounting numbers are favourable (Plantin et al., 2008). Given an imperfectly liquid 
market, the aggregation of managerial decisions, in turn, impacts the yield spread of 
banks’ asset-backed securities, which ultimately changes the accounting value of the 
portfolios (Plantin et al., 2008). Therefore, in this dissertation, I investigate the impact of 
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measurement regime (historical cost versus fair value) on firms’ credit risk and cost of 
debt. 
In Chapter 3, I examine the relative explanatory power of fair value accounting 
information in explaining credit ratings, i.e., the debt contracting value of fair value 
accounting information. In addition, I test the moderating effect of auditor industry 
expertise on fair value’s debt contracting value. Empirical results indicate that compared 
to historical cost, fair value accounting information better predicts short-term credit 
ratings. This finding is consistent with Plantin et al. (2008)’s argument regarding the 
inefficiencies of historical cost accounting system within a short-term perspective. They 
argue that with a short time horizon, firms have incentives to sell appreciating assets 
because they can book gains immediately under historical cost. The historical cost system 
does not allow asset appreciation and, therefore, keeping these assets on the books does 
not lead to better-looking financial statement. A direct consequence of the historical cost 
system, therefore, is that it leads to inefficient sales. A natural remedy to the inefficiency 
in the historical cost regime is to shift to a fair value regime in which the book values of 
assets are reevaluated in case of an upward market trend.  In contrast, the empirical 
results show that, in the long run, fair value accounting does not outperform historical 
cost in providing debt-contracting value, as proxied by its ability to predict long-term 
credit ratings. This evidence is consistent with opponents’ argument that long-term assets, 
compared with short-term assets, are difficult to evaluate under fair value (Wang et al., 
2005). This result indicates that the Achilles’ heel of fair value is its application to long-
term assets. In addition, additional tests reveal that auditor industry expertise improves 
fair value’s debt contracting value. This finding shows that hiring an industry specialized 
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auditor is helpful to address the reliability concern of fair value accounting information. 
One implication of this evidence is that professional knowledge and strong monitoring, as 
industry specialized auditors provide, are useful remedy to alleviate the reliability 
concern of fair value accounting information.    
In Chapter 4, I investigate how use of fair value in the financial statements affects banks’ 
cost of debt. Measurement regimes impact the cost of debt via the elimination of the 
opportunities for managers to realize “gains trading” under a historical cost accounting 
system (Plantin et al., 2008).  Empirical results show that greater use of fair value 
accounting in the financial statements generally leads to a lower cost of debt, which 
supports proponents’ argument that fair value accounting improves the decision 
usefulness of accounting information. One possible reason is that debtholder’s regard the 
use of fair value as an overall positive signal to alleviate the information asymmetry 
problems due to lack of inside information. Market-based fair value numbers are 
perceived to be subject to less manipulation. Results further show that among the fair 
value breakdowns, more use of Level 1 and Level 2 fair values are associated with a 
lower cost of debt, while more use of Level 3 fair values is related to a higher cost of debt. 
This finding suggests that debt holders appreciate the improved relevance of fair value 
due to Level 1 and 2 inputs but penalize a firm for the reduced reliability caused by Level 
3 inputs. In addition, evidence shows that auditor industry expertise improves the 
decision usefulness of fair value accounting information, especially Level 3 inputs, to 
debtholders, resulting in a lower cost of debt. Among the three levels of fair value inputs, 
Level 3 inputs are most subject to estimation errors and/or managerial manipulations. 
That is why industry specialized auditors impact Level 3 fair value inputs the most. 
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Besides the contribution to the academic literature, this dissertation has the following 
practical implications. From a standard setter’s perspective, the finding that fair value 
accounting improves the short-term debt contracting value of accounting information and 
benefits the firms through a lower cost of borrowing give support to FASB’s fair value 
proposal. However, based on the evidence that fair value does not dominate historical 
cost accounting in predicting firms’ long-term credit risk, standard setters should be 
cautious when implementing a full fair value accounting system. Also, policymakers may 
use the empirical evidence that auditor industry expertise improves fair value 
accounting’s decision usefulness to increase the decision usefulness of fair value 
accounting information. Given that the major concerns regarding fair value revolve 
around its reliability, improving auditors’ knowledge of fair value inputs seems to be one 
of the solutions to resolve the low reliability issue of fair value accounting. From a bond 
issuer and broker perspective, empirical results implicitly suggest that when negotiating 
the yield spread of new corporate bond issues, related parties may take issuers’ use of fair 
value and auditor specialists into consideration.  
This dissertation is subject to limitations. First, my sample may not be representative of 
all bank holding companies in the United States. However, I am not aware of any 
particular bias in the attributes of the sample firms. Second, the time period for the yield 
spread sample is relatively short. However, due to the restriction that fair value disclosure 
is only mandatory since fiscal year 2007, there is not much room for improvement. Third, 
I only focus on the credit ratings and yield spread of corporate bond issues, which are but 
two attributes of firms’ credit risks. Forth, I try to control for the endogenous issue in my 
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second essay by using a two-stage model, which is not a perfect solution to address 
endogeneity. This is a caveat of this dissertation.  
Future research can extend the analysis to the relation between fair value accounting and 
other bond market attributes, such as the liquidity and abnormal return of corporate bond, 
the maturity and issue amount of bond issue terms. Besides, given sufficient data, 
conducting a change analysis to compare the relative explanatory power of fair value in 
explaining credit ratings adds greater insights. In addition, more effort can be call for to 
resolve the endogeneity issues in the research methodology in this study.  
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Table 1 
Credit Rating Score Assignment 
           Panel A: Short-term credit rating scores 
Moody's S&P Fitch Assigned rating score 
P-1 A-1+ F1+ 5 
- A-1 F1 4 
P-2 A-2 F2 3 
P-3 A-3 F3 2 
Not 
prime B B 1 
 
Panel B: Long-term credit rating scores 
Moody's  S&P Fitch Assigned rating score 
A1 and above A+ and above A+ and above 13 
A2 A A 12 
A3 A- A- 11 
BAA1 BBB+ BBB+ 10 
BAA2 BBB BBB 9 
BAA3 BBB- BBB- 8 
BA1 BB+ BB+ 7 
BA2 BB BB 6 
BA3 BB- BB- 5 
B1 B+ B+ 4 
B2 B B 3 
B3 B- B- 2 
below below below 1 
 
Notes: This table presents details of credit ratings score assignment for the three credit ratings 
agencies: Moody’s, Stand & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch. The credit ratings provided by the 
three credit ratings agencies are structured in a consistent way. Panel A shows the rating 
score assignment for short-term credit ratings and Panel B shows the rating score assignment 
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Table 2  
Accounting Variables That Explain Credit Ratings 
Variables Label  Predicted sign Definitions 
LEV leverage - Total liabilities divided by total 
assets 
ROA return on 
assets 
+ Income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets 
LOSS loss - One if the income before 




+ operating income before 
depreciation divided by interest 
expense 
SIZE firm size + natural log of total assets 
Notes: This table provides definitions of the independent variables in the regression model. 
LEV represents leverage, and is defined as total liabilities over total assets. It is expected to 
be negatively associated with firms’ credit rating scores. ROA represents return on assets, 
and is defined as income before extraordinary items over total assets. It is expected to be 
positively associated with credit rating scores. Loss is an indicator variable that equals to one 
if the income before extraordinary items is negative, and zero otherwise. It is expected to be 
negatively associated with credit rating scores. COV represents interest coverage, and is 
defined as operating income before depreciation over interest expense. It is expected to be 
positively associated with credit rating score. Size represents firm size, and is defined as the 
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Table 3 
Percentage of Audit Fees Earned by Big 4 Auditors in banking industry (two-







2003 37 18 20 15 90 
2004 43 18 15 13 89 
2005 42 20 14 10 86 
2006 39 19 15 10 83 
2007 36 20 16 9 81 
2008 32 27 15 7 81 
2009 31 30 14 6 81 
2010 33 31 6 14 84 
2011 32 30 5 16 83 
 
Notes: The numbers reported in this table represents the percentage of audit fees earned by Big 
4 auditors in the banking industry for a specific year. For example, in 2003, 37% of the audit 
fees in the banking industry are earned by KPMG. 
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Table 4 
Sample Selection Process 
Process # of Firms 
Firms with credit ratings issued by one of the three rating agencies 
between 2003 and 2010 
1877 
Less: observations with missing value of at least one measure of fair 
value or historical cost components for the five accounting variables  
353 
full sample 1524 
Sample for short-term credit ratings 898 
Less: firms that auditor information is missing 39 
Subsample for auditor industry expertise 173 
Subsample for non-auditor industry expertise 686 
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Table 5  
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Full Sample (N = 1524)  
Variable  Mean Std Dev Minimum 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Maximum 
LEV_HC  0.892709 0.017032 0.813062 0.87837 0.892286 0.900073 0.981431 
LEV_FV  0.870508 0.059683 0.664444 0.852086 0.871505 0.896395 0.991415 
ROA_HC  0.004835 0.012525 -0.07961 -0.00137 0.008103 0.013362 0.072677 
ROA_FV  -0.04889 0.066056 -0.30178 -0.06469 -0.05703 0.009672 0.104743 
LOSS_HC  0.386300 0.486958 0 0 0 1 1 
LOSS_FV  0.694548 0.460652 0 0 1 1 1 
COV_HC  0.889956 0.982921 -2.99355 0.488157 0.860159 1.237283 12.66776 
COV_FV  0.889956 0.982921 -2.99355 0.488157 0.860159 1.237283 12.66776 
SIZE_HC  17.85095 1.233817 13.57368 17.66573 17.78825 17.82808 21.53560 
SIZE_FV  17.83489 1.226773 13.57135 17.66512 17.7913 17.80856 21.50853 
Panel B: Sample for short-term credit ratings (N = 898) 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Maximum 
SCORE 4.035635 1.278787 1 4 4 5 5 
LEV_HC 0.893550 0.017280 0.813062 0.87837 0.892286 0.899463 0.981431 
LEV_FV 0.871310 0.056320 0.664444 0.852086 0.880385 0.894943 0.991415 
ROA_HC 0.006162 0.012567 -0.07961 -0.00137 0.012877 0.013362 0.072677 
ROA_FV -0.04321 0.062042 -0.30178 -0.06469 -0.05703 0.013277 0.048485 
LOSS_HC 0.324054 0.468281 0 0 0 1 1 
LOSS_FV 0.655902 0.475338 0 0 1 1 1 
COV_HC 0.931639 1.018646 -2.99355 0.488157 0.860159 1.237283 12.66776 
COV_FV 0.931639 1.018646 -2.99355 0.488157 0.860159 1.237283 12.66776 
SIZE_HC 17.71021 1.258115 13.57368 17.66573 17.78825 17.82808 21.53560 
SIZE_FV 17.69638 1.251522 13.57135 17.66512 17.7913 17.80856 21.50853 
 
     (This table is continued on the next page) 
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(Table 5 Continued) 
Panel C: Subsample for short-term credit ratings with auditor industry expertise 
(N=173) 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Maximum 
SCORE 4.358382 1.270827 1 4 5 5 5 
LEV_HC 0.899652 0.025871 0.813062 0.886185 0.900052 0.916877 0.981431 
LEV_FV 0.893900 0.068109 0.738032 0.861919 0.892377 0.918195 0.991415 
ROA_HC 0.006634 0.016789 -0.06579 0.001756 0.010628 0.015164 0.072677 
ROA_FV -0.0431 0.077282 -0.27089 -0.07639 -0.01401 0.013288 0.048485 
LOSS_HC 0.202312 0.402890 0 0 0 0 1 
LOSS_FV 0.606936 0.489849 0 0 1 1 1 
COV_HC 1.341578 1.796675 -2.99355 0.650414 1.05132 1.544678 12.66776 
COV_FV 1.341578 1.796675 -2.99355 0.650414 1.05132 1.544678 12.66776 
SIZE_HC 17.53969 1.995803 14.8355 15.94933 16.89567 19.05049 21.53560 
SIZE_FV 17.51766 1.983512 14.84858 15.93661 16.88292 18.98251 21.50853 
Panel D: Subsample for short-term credit ratings without auditor industry expertise 
(N=686) 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Maximum 
SCORE 3.937318 1.295869 1 4 4 5 5 
LEV_HC 0.892495 0.014236 0.851215 0.87837 0.892286 0.896365 0.97259 
LEV_FV 0.865455 0.052862 0.664444 0.820716 0.85363 0.893795 0.985838 
ROA_HC 0.00616 0.011458 -0.07961 -0.00137 0.012877 0.013362 0.024952 
ROA_FV -0.04389 0.058985 -0.30178 -0.06469 -0.05703 0.013277 0.040418 
LOSS_HC 0.342566 0.474914 0 0 0 1 1 
LOSS_FV 0.664723 0.472432 0 0 1 1 1 
COV_HC 0.823199 0.64975 -1.73808 0.488157 0.860159 1.237283 7.822457 
COV_FV 0.823199 0.64975 -1.73808 0.488157 0.860159 1.237283 7.822457 
SIZE_HC 17.77909 0.986008 13.71485 17.66573 17.78825 17.82808 21.25713 
SIZE_FV 17.7673 0.981108 13.70362 17.66512 17.7913 17.80856 21.23247 
 (This table is continued on the next page) 
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(Table 5 Continued) 
Panel E: Sample for long-term credit rating (N=626) 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Maximum 
SCORE 9.795786 2.561031 1 9 10 11 13 
LEV_HC 0.897617 0.021272 0.813062 0.882319 0.897175 0.913273 0.981431 
LEV_FV 0.885357 0.067585 0.664444 0.852086 0.89454 0.919317 0.991415 
ROA_HC 0.004387 0.015626 -0.07961 -0.00137 0.007465 0.014194 0.072677 
ROA_FV -0.04374 0.075605 -0.30178 -0.06469 -0.02007 0.012175 0.104743 
LOSS_HC 0.319871 0.466804 0 0 0 1 1 
LOSS_FV 0.605816 0.48907 0 0 1 1 1 
COV_HC 1.099591 1.360205 -2.99355 0.488157 0.894284 1.517712 12.66776 
COV_FV 1.099591 1.360205 -2.99355 0.488157 0.894284 1.517712 12.66776 
SIZE_HC 17.55240 1.625883 13.57368 16.33109 17.76404 18.46317 21.53560 
SIZE_FV 17.53425 1.616507 13.57135 16.28736 17.73899 18.39936 21.50853 
Notes: SCORE represents credit rating scores. It is an ordinal variable that takes a value 
from 1 to 13 for long-term ratings and 1 to 5 for short-term ratings. LEV_HC represents 
the historical cost measure of LEV. LEV_FV represents the fair value measure of LEV.  
LEV represents leverage, and is defined as total liabilities over total assets. It is expected 
to be negatively associated with firms’ credit rating scores. ROA represents return on 
assets, and is defined as income before extraordinary items over total assets. It is 
expected to be positively associated with credit rating scores. LOSS is an indicator 
variable that equals to one if the income before extraordinary items is negative, and zero 
otherwise. It is expected to be negatively associated with credit rating scores. COV 
represents interest coverage, and is defined as operating income before depreciation over 
interest expense. It is expected to be positively associated with credit rating score. SIZE 
represents firm size, and is defined as the natural log of total assets. It is expected to be 
positively associated with credit rating score.  
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Table 6 Correlation Tables 
Panel A: Sample for short-term credit ratings 
  SCORE LEV_HC LEV_FV ROA_HC ROA_FV LOSS_HC LOSS_FV COV_HC COV_FV SIZE_HC SIZE_FV 
SCORE 1 -0.30181*** -0.13962*** 0.62958*** 0.32049*** -0.59025*** -0.47146*** 0.75809*** 0.75809*** 0.15444*** 0.15773*** 
 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LEV_HC -0.18439*** 1 0.16562*** -0.33882*** -0.15506*** 0.52608*** 0.15657*** -0.33072*** -0.33072*** -0.14118*** -0.1323*** 
 
<.0001   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LEV_FV -0.07484** 0.16707*** 1 -0.01332 -0.41459*** 0.03467 0.49052*** -0.16189*** -0.16189*** -0.37011*** -0.38359*** 
 
0.0249 <.0001   0.6901 <.0001 0.2994 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
ROA_HC 0.54206*** 0.04111 -0.2617*** 1 0.48898*** -0.81698*** -0.50985*** 0.79627*** 0.79627*** -0.18566*** -0.17943*** 
 
<.0001 0.2185 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
ROA_FV 0.11398*** -0.0365 -0.44171*** 0.31648*** 1 -0.49443*** -0.82929*** 0.49702*** 0.49702*** -0.58922*** -0.57626*** 
 
0.0006 0.2745 <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSS_HC -0.60387*** 0.34607*** 0.13674*** -0.75669*** -0.26698*** 1 0.46144*** -0.7378*** -0.7378*** 0.23464*** 0.22835*** 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSS_FV -0.38513*** 0.12687*** 0.33035*** -0.39374*** -0.67441*** 0.46144*** 1 -0.57631*** -0.57631*** 0.47894*** 0.47536*** 
 
<.0001 0.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
COV_HC 0.47072*** -0.0585* -0.0168 0.4995*** 0.22431*** -0.45521*** -0.36451*** 1 1.00000*** -0.11606*** -0.11025*** 
 
<.0001 0.0798 0.6152 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 0.0005 0.0009 
COV_FV 0.47072*** -0.0585* -0.0168 0.4995*** 0.22431*** -0.45521*** -0.36451*** 1.00000*** 1 -0.11606*** -0.11025*** 
 
<.0001 0.0798 0.6152 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   0.0005 0.0009 
SIZE_HC 0.29992*** -0.056* -0.45525*** 0.033 -0.60499*** -0.00145 0.3491*** 0.02003 0.02003 1 0.99695*** 
 
<.0001 0.0935 <.0001 0.3232 <.0001 0.9653 <.0001 0.5488 0.5488   <.0001 
SIZE_FV 0.30459*** -0.05402 -0.46643*** 0.04212 -0.59513*** -0.00993 0.34257*** 0.02325 0.02325 0.99977*** 1 
  <.0001 0.1057 <.0001 0.2073 <.0001 0.7663 <.0001 0.4865 0.4865 <.0001   
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Panel B: Subsample for short-term credit ratings with auditor industry expertise 
  SCORE LEV_HC LEV_FV ROA_HC ROA_FV LOSS_HC LOSS_FV COV_HC COV_FV SIZE_HC SIZE_FV 
SCORE 1 -0.36872*** -0.21039*** 0.68041*** 0.47384*** -0.58952*** -0.63474*** 0.79445*** 0.79445*** 0.03581 0.02861 
    <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.349 0.4544 
LEV_HC -0.33707*** 1 0.00295 -0.46577*** -0.29442*** 0.67147*** 0.23391*** -0.44918*** -0.44918*** -0.14143*** -0.12307*** 
  <.0001   0.9384 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 0.0012 
LEV_FV -0.04119 -0.04282 1 -0.00939 -0.45009*** 0.07814** 0.6013*** -0.14564*** -0.14564*** -0.29315*** -0.31105*** 
  0.2814 0.2627   0.806 <.0001 0.0408 <.0001 0.0001 0.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
ROA_HC 0.52647*** -0.28377*** -0.32265*** 1 0.56674*** -0.83427*** -0.58071*** 0.83939*** 0.83939*** -0.32031*** -0.31108*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
ROA_FV 0.1789*** -0.07361* -0.56107*** 0.32185*** 1 -0.5814*** -0.82991*** 0.61256*** 0.61256*** -0.61603*** -0.59558*** 
  <.0001 0.054 <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSS_HC -0.60315*** 0.56004*** 0.16773*** -0.7955*** -0.29736*** 1 0.49314*** -0.75697*** -0.75697*** 0.38581*** 0.37699*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSS_FV -0.48745*** 0.29398*** 0.44645*** -0.40921*** -0.69145*** 0.49314*** 1 -0.68293*** -0.68293*** 0.45018*** 0.44618*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
COV_HC 0.59648*** -0.30241*** -0.03005 0.60186*** 0.28612*** -0.58047*** -0.50922*** 1 1.00000*** -0.24557*** -0.23353*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 0.4319 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
COV_FV 0.59648*** -0.30241*** -0.03005 0.60186*** 0.28612*** -0.58047*** -0.50922*** 1.00000*** 1 -0.24557*** -0.23353*** 
  <.0001 <.0001 0.4319 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 
SIZE_HC 0.249*** -0.04763*** -0.47838*** 0.01209 -0.5869*** 0.04619 0.25375*** 0.02499 0.02499 1 0.9944*** 
  <.0001 0.2128 <.0001 0.7518 <.0001 0.227 <.0001 0.5135 0.5135   <.0001 
SIZE_FV 0.25631*** -0.03864 -0.48919*** 0.02688 -0.57603*** 0.03316 0.24629*** 0.03342 0.03342 0.9997*** 1 
  <.0001 0.3122 <.0001 0.4822 <.0001 0.3858 <.0001 0.3822 0.3822 <.0001   
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Panel C: Subsample for short-term credit ratings without auditor industry expertise 
  SCORE LEV_HC LEV_FV ROA_HC ROA_FV LOSS_HC LOSS_FV COV_HC COV_FV SIZE_HC SIZE_FV 
SCORE 1 -0.10175 -0.39439*** 0.36952*** -0.19264 -0.47077*** 0.1186 0.56387*** 0.56387*** 0.63517*** 0.63932*** 
    0.1828 <.0001 <.0001 0.0111 <.0001 0.1202 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LEV_HC -0.21115*** 1 0.44823*** -0.20502*** -0.32079*** 0.23112*** 0.27305*** -0.20672*** -0.20672*** -0.07268 -0.07827 
  0.0053   <.0001 0.0068 <.0001 0.0022 0.0003 0.0064 0.0064 0.3419 0.3061 
LEV_FV -0.36057*** 0.43584*** 1 -0.16285** -0.1027 0.41757*** 0.04977 -0.21802*** -0.21802*** -0.4102*** -0.4211*** 
  <.0001 <.0001   0.0323 0.1788 <.0001 0.5155 0.004 0.004 <.0001 <.0001 
ROA_HC 0.58363*** -0.37812*** -0.23203*** 1 0.39218*** -0.69595*** -0.39724*** 0.64047*** 0.64047*** -0.11552 -0.11047 
  <.0001 <.0001 0.0021   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1301 0.1479 
ROA_FV 0.1238 -0.25089*** -0.1579** 0.3019*** 1 -0.25763*** -0.84616*** 0.16907** 0.16907** -0.62788*** -0.61693*** 
  0.1046 0.0009 0.038 <.0001   0.0006 <.0001 0.0262 0.0262 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSS_HC 0.53987*** 0.27757*** 0.34804*** -0.72514*** -0.17014** 1 0.28744*** -0.56627*** -0.56627*** -0.11297 -0.11844 
  <.0001 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 0.0252   0.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1389 0.1207 
LOSS_FV 0.05015 0.29044*** 0.0255 -0.36098*** -0.63447*** 0.28744*** 1 -0.18748** -0.18748** 0.55178*** 0.54277*** 
  0.5123 0.0001 0.7392 <.0001 <.0001 0.0001   0.0135 0.0135 <.0001 <.0001 
COV_HC 0.392*** -0.2501*** -0.07573 0.44188*** 0.17252** -0.34763*** -0.2286*** 1 1.00000*** 0.13768* 0.14114* 
  <.0001 0.0009 0.3221 <.0001 0.0232 <.0001 0.0025   <.0001 0.0709 0.064 
COV_FV 0.392*** -0.2501*** -0.07573 0.44188*** 0.17252** -0.34763*** -0.2286*** 1.00000*** 1 0.13768* 0.14114* 
  <.0001 0.0009 0.3221 <.0001 0.0232 <.0001 0.0025 <.0001   0.0709 0.064 
SIZE_HC 0.57063*** -0.01854 -0.43541*** 0.05766 -0.67936*** -0.12916* 0.54894*** 0.1145 0.1145 1 0.99931*** 
  <.0001 0.8086 <.0001 0.4511 <.0001 0.0903 <.0001 0.1336 0.1336   <.0001 
SIZE_FV 0.57376*** -0.02273 -0.44772*** 0.06086 -0.66993*** -0.1341* 0.54291*** 0.11625 0.11625 0.99983*** 1 
  <.0001 0.7666 <.0001 0.4264 <.0001 0.0786 <.0001 0.1277 0.1277 <.0001   
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Panel D: Sample for long-term credit rating 
  score LEV_HC LEV_FV ROA_HC ROA_FV LOSS_HC LOSS_FV COV_HC COV_FV SIZE_HC SIZE_FV 
SCORE 1 0.12882*** -0.24438*** 0.51044*** 0.03796 -0.54131*** -0.21643*** 0.62024*** 0.62024*** 0.48958*** 0.49653*** 
    0.0013 <.0001 <.0001 0.3466 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LEV_HC -0.10946*** 1 0.36686*** -0.18593*** -0.09334** 0.28177*** 0.15609*** -0.09132** -0.09132** -0.13418*** -0.13319*** 
  0.0065   <.0001 <.0001 0.0202 <.0001 <.0001 0.0231 0.0231 0.0008 0.0009 
LEV_FV -0.35342*** 0.21169*** 1 -0.15723*** -0.19705*** 0.15572*** 0.18565*** -0.08888** -0.08888** -0.32879*** -0.34038*** 
  <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 <.0001 0.027 0.027 <.0001 <.0001 
ROA_HC 0.59737*** -0.06973* -0.27621*** 1 0.36676*** -0.80824*** -0.4055*** 0.70364*** 0.70364*** -0.00019 0.00611 
  <.0001 0.083 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9962 0.8793 
ROA_FV 0.06463 -0.05477 -0.45591*** 0.24629*** 1 -0.41258*** -0.84679*** 0.36312*** 0.36312*** -0.53416*** -0.52056*** 
  0.1088 0.1735 <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LOSS_HC -0.51322*** 0.17026*** 0.22025*** -0.74087*** -0.20256*** 1 0.48231*** -0.67461*** -0.67461*** 0.03173 0.02414 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.4307 0.5488 
LOSS_FV -0.23544*** 0.08991** 0.16904*** -0.39412*** -0.64025*** 0.48231*** 1 -0.4564*** -0.4564*** 0.40581*** 0.39558*** 
  <.0001 0.0253 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
COV_HC 0.45643*** -0.07569* -0.06495 0.50786*** 0.19773*** -0.4576*** -0.34843*** 1 1.00000*** 0.06395 0.06969* 
  <.0001 0.0598 0.1065 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 0.112 0.0832 
COV_FV 0.45643*** -0.07569* -0.06495 0.50786*** 0.19773*** -0.4576*** -0.34843*** 1.0000*** 1 0.06395 0.06969* 
  <.0001 0.0598 0.1065 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   0.112 0.0832 
SIZE_HC 0.47048*** -0.05731 -0.49708*** 0.07112* -0.66062*** -0.03563 0.40655*** 0.02401 0.02401 1 0.9992*** 
  <.0001 0.1544 <.0001 0.0771 <.0001 0.3761 <.0001 0.551 0.551   <.0001 
SIZE_FV 0.47541*** -0.05628 -0.50718*** 0.07762* -0.65209*** -0.04275 0.39858*** 0.02717 0.02717 0.99981*** 1 
  <.0001 0.1619 <.0001 0.0536 <.0001 0.2883 <.0001 0.4999 0.4999 <.0001   
Notes: SCORE represents credit rating scores. It is an ordinal variable that takes a value from 1 to 13. LEV_HC represents the historical 
cost measure of LEV. LEV_FV represents the fair value measure of LEV.  LEV represents leverage, and is defined as total liabilities over 
total assets. It is expected to be negatively associated with firms’ credit rating scores. ROA represents return on assets, and is defined as 
income before extraordinary items over total assets. It is expected to be positively associated with credit rating scores. LOSS is an indicator 
variable that equals to one if the income before extraordinary items is negative, and zero otherwise. It is expected to be negatively 
associated with credit rating scores. COV represents interest coverage, and is defined as operating income before depreciation over interest 
expense. It is expected to be positively associated with credit rating score. SIZE represents firm size, and is defined as the natural log of 
total assets. It is expected to be positively associated with credit rating score.  
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Table 7 Ordered logit models for short-term and long-term debt contracting value  








Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
LEV -0.4475 0.6680 -2.1363** 0.0286 
     ROA 3.5610*** 0.0074 0.563*** <.0001 
     LOSS -2.3838*** <.0001 -2.704*** <.0001 
     COV 1.3897*** <.0001 1.515*** <.0001 
     SIZE 0.9029*** <.0001 1.686*** <.0001 







   
-4.4023 
 <.0001 
                          Panel B: Long- term debt contracting value 
Variables historical cost   fair value   
 
Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
LEV -3.2799*** <.0001 -3.6429*** <.0001 
     ROA 3.7826*** <.0001 3.0578*** <.0001 
     LOSS -1.9677*** <.0001 -1.7508*** <.0001 
     COV 0.4729*** <.0001 0.0871*** <.0001 
     SIZE 0.9674*** <.0001 0.0704*** <.0001 







   
1.2888 
        0.1975 
Notes: Dependent variable is SCORE, credit rating score. The first two columns show the 
estimated coefficients and the P-value of independent variables for the historical cost model. 
The last two columns present the estimated coefficients and the P-value of independent 
variables for the fair value model. All variables are defined in Table 1.   
           ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   




Table 8 Ordered logit models for debt contracting value and auditor industry 
expertise 








Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
LEV -3.8334** 0.0180 -3.6889** 0.0270 
   
  
ROA 39.1187** 0.0200 5.2407*** <.0001 
   
  
LOSS -0.4346*** <.0001 -3.6937*** <.0001 
   
  
COV 0.2545** 0.0453 1.4845** 0.0356 
   
  








   
-3.323 
    
<.0001 








Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
LEV -3.2608*** <.0001 -3.2877* 0.0867 
     ROA 64.2736*** <.0001 12.5440*** <.0001 
     LOSS -1.1655*** <.0001 -0.5697* 0.0684 
     COV 0.1837*** <.0001 0.4283*** <.0001 








   
-4.4023 
 <.0001 
Notes: Dependent variable is SCORE, credit rating score. The first two columns show the 
estimated coefficients and the P-value of independent variables for the historical cost model. 
The last two columns present the estimated coefficients and the P-value of independent 
variables for the fair value model. All variables are defined in Table 1.   
           ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
           G-Rsquare represents the generalized R2 of the ordered logit model.  
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Table 9 Robustness Check with Alternative Proxies 
 












(1) 0.3568 0.5236 0.4562 0.3951 
(2) 0.3789 0.5324 0.4358 0.3845 
 (3) 0.4012 0.5321 0.4216 0.3915 
 (4) 0.3156 0.5455 0.4421 0.4123 
Notes: Proxy (1) shows the results of empirical analysis with long-term debt/total assets as an 
alternative proxy for leverage. Proxy (2) reports the results with cash flow before interest and 
taxes/total debt as an alternative proxy for interest coverage. Proxy (3) lists the results of total 
market capitalization as an alternative proxy for firm size. Proxy (4) shows the results with the 
efficiency ratio, defined as the non-interest expense of the banks divided by operating revenue, 
as an alternative proxy for interest coverage ratio.  
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Table 10 Robustness Checks with Exclusion of Loss 








Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
LEV -0.615** 0.0321 -2.845** 0.0186 
     ROA 5.123*** <.0001 0.632*** <.0001 
     COV 1.845*** <.0001 1.985*** <.0001 
     SIZE 1.052*** <.0001 2.354*** <.0001 






    
 
                          Panel B: Long- term debt contracting value 
Variables historical cost   fair value   
 
Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
LEV -3.987*** <.0001 -3.785*** <.0001 
     ROA 39.146*** <.0001 10.526*** <.0001 
     COV 0.987*** <.0001 0.098*** <.0001 
     SIZE 0.995*** <.0001 0.072*** <.0001 






         
 Notes: Dependent variable is SCORE, credit rating score. The first two columns show the 
estimated coefficients and the P-value of independent variables for the historical cost model. 
The last two columns present the estimated coefficients and the P-value of independent 
variables for the fair value model. All variables are defined in Table 1.   
           ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   







Table 11 Sample Selection Process 
Process # of Obs. 
Sample A: Bond-year data from SNL Financial Capital Offering 
database from January 1, 2008 to April 30, 2012. 589 
Sample B:  
(1) Retrieve bank-year credit ratings data from SNL Financial 
Companies where the rated firms have fair value data. Sample 
period is 2007-2011. 252 
(2) Less: firms that firm-year auditor information is missing in 
the same period 0 




Table 12 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Panel A: Continuous and Discrete Variables 
Rating Sample (N=252) 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
Rating 9.0667543 3.522712 1 10 15.57143 
FairValue 0.3239807 0.398179 0.003834 0.226025 2.840384 
Level1 0.0209197 0.044508 0 0.002448 0.251749 
Level2 0.2791013 0.356603 0.001422 0.191995 2.591017 
Level3 0.0200496 0.042463 0 0.002777 0.248151 
Leverage 0.8961955 0.030244 0.743461 0.897367 0.996731 
InterestCov 0.4038754 1.620827 -5.96128 0.369751 10.48533 
ROA 0.0366568 1.513731 -6.81033 0.054114 2.465794 
IssuerSize 17.159674 1.704752 13.76314 16.6834 21.54119 
Yield Spread Sample  (N=376) 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mini
mum 
Median Maximum 
YieldSpread 3.04857 2.24478 0.365 2.3 16.33 
FairValue 0.89125 0.73535 0.0688
5 
0.82203 2.046128 
Level1 0.0759 0.0751 0 0.07184 0.25175 
Level2 0.76777 0.65548 0.04027 
0.71761 1.81424 
Level3 0.06497 0.06824 0 0.04451 0.2203 
Maturity 0.75528 0.32373 0.2809
4 
0.77944 1.49255 
IssueSize 4.68714 1.22425 1.3979
4 
4.50687 6.87506 
Leverage 0.89781 0.01924 0.8372
5 
0.89622 0.94571 
                                                             
8 In theory, fair value percentage (FairValue) should not exceed 2. However, due to the treatment of 
Netting adjustment, Fair Value can go beyond 2. See Appendix 3 for illustration. 
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IssuerSize 19.93781 1.67316 15.912
09 
21.16933 21.54119 




Panel B: Dummy Variables 
Variable N  Percent 
Loss     252 24.6 
Expert     252 30.7 
Expert     376 47.5 
Underwritten    376 32.4 
Convertible    376   5.3 
Refer to Appendix 2 for variable definitions 
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Table 13 Correlation Matrix 






FairValue 0.299***       
Specialist -0.192*** 0.791***      
Leverage -0.170 0.177*** 0.2687***     
InterestCov 0.442*** 0.038 0.359*** -0.200***    
ROA 0.602*** 0.053 0.201* -0.251*** 0.753***   
Loss -0.526*** -0.061 0.312 0.063* -0.574*** -0.770***  
Size 0.559*** 0.628*** 0.678*** -0.021 0.055 0.121* -0.062 
Note:  *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level respectively. 
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Table 13 (continued) 
Panel B: Yield Spread Sample 
  Spread Rating Fair 
Value 



































































































































































































































Note:  *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level respectively.
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 Table 14 Credit Rating Model  
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛼2𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0,…,5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                 (1) 
Explanatory Variable   T-Value P-Value 
Intercept -0.54 -0.1 0.9177 
FairValue 0.16 3.58 0.0004 
Specialist -0.45 -1.62 0.1068 
Leverage -8.88 -1.78 0.0772 
InterestCov 0.094 0.7 0.4839 
ROA 0.64 3.5 0.0006 
Loss -1.91 -3.99 <.0001 
Size 1.09 10.59 <.0001 
Year Dummies YES   
Adjusted R2 0.6947   
F-Statistics 41.58   




Table 15 Yield Spread Model 
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑂𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0,…,5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                (2) 
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑂𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙2𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙3𝑖𝑡+𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0,…,5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                (3) 
Explanatory  
Variable 
Model (2) Model (3) 
Coefficient T-Value P-Value Coefficient T-Value P-Value 
Intercept 2.20095 0.37 0.7091 1.91 0.28 0.7805 
OrthRating -0.4889 -5.02 <.0001 -0.59 -5.45 <.0001 
FairValue -0.2319 -2.21 0.0274    
Level1    -0.02 -2.79 0.0168 
Level2    -0.01 -2.33 0.0301 
Level3    0.02 1.71 0.0857 
Underwriter -1.1244 -4.46 <.0001 -0.03 -3.13 <.0001 
Maturity -0.8065 -2.34 0.0201 -0.74 -2.11 0.0355 
IssueSize -0.8618 -7.78 <.0001 -0.17 -1.31 0.1895 
Convertible 6.50818 13.28 <.0001 6.83 12.93 <.0001 
Leverage 11.8847 1.69 0.0911 14.59 1.66 0.0984 
InterestCov -0.0545 -11.56 <.0001 -0.08 -0.59 0.5569 
IssuerSize -0.5292 -3.9 0.0001 -0.64 -4.1 <.0001 
ROA -1.72828 -5.83 <.0001 -1.90 -5.87 <.0001 
Year  YES      
Adjusted R2 0.73    0.74   
F-Statistics 58.26         49.93   
# of Obs 376         376   
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Table 16 Yield Spread Model with Auditor Industry Expertise 
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑂𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼4𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0,…,5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                           (6) 
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑂𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙2𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙3𝑖𝑡+𝛼5𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙1𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙2𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡+𝛼8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙3𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0,…,5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                            (7) 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Model (6) Model (7) 
Coefficient T-Value P-Value Coefficient T-Value P-Value 
Intercept 7.93 1.29 0.20 3.19 0.51 0.61 
OrthRating -0.53 -5.23 <0.0001 -0.48 -4.48 <.0001 
FairValue -0.73 -1.75 0.08    
Level1    -0.11 -1.73 0.08 
Level2    -0.01 -1.99 0.06 
Level3    0.59 -3.92 0.0001 
Specialist -0.07 -3.6 0.0004 -1.65 -2.95       0.003 
FV*Specialist -1.26 -2.57 0.01    
Level1*Specialist    -0.07 -1.05 0.29 
Level2*Specialist    -0.01 -0.42 0.67 
Level3*Specialist    -0.77 -4.6 <0.0001 
Underwriter 0.03 0.13 0.90 0.21 0.77 0.44 
Maturity -0.75 -2.21 0.03 -0.18 -0.54 0.59 
IssueSize -0.14 -1.1 0.27 -0.49 -3.86 0.0001 
Convertible 7.54 12.93 <.0001 6.62 10.3 <.0001 
Leverage 9.31 1.32 0.19 15.05 1.96 0.05 
InterestCov -0.08 -0.72 0.47 -0.16 -1.32 0.19 
IssuerSize -0.66 -4.78 <.0001 -0.56 -3.56 0.0004 
ROA -1.69 -5.68 <.0001 -0.90 -3.59 0.0004 
Adjusted R2 0.74   0.68   
F-Statistics 54.26   50.35   
# of Obs 376   376   
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Table 17 Robustness Check with Market Capitalization as denominator of Fair Value 
Measures 
 Model (2) Model (3) Model (6) Model (7) 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept 0.72 0.05 3.36 6.25 
OrthRating -0.52*** -0.54*** -0.62*** -0.55*** 
FairValue -0.01**  -0.07*  
Level1  -0.06*  -0.07* 
Level2  -0.02*  -0.05* 
Level3  0.08**  0.11** 
Specialist   0.28 0.53 
FairValue*Specialist   -0.07***  
Level1*Specialist    -1.15 
Level2*Specialist    -0.04 
Level3*Specialist    -0.97*** 
Underwriter 0.10 0.12 0.03 -0.007 
Maturity -0.83** -0.85** 0.79** -0.76** 
IssueSize -0.23* -0.23* -0.17 -0.15* 
Convertible 6.57*** 6.64*** 7.37*** 7.52*** 
Leverage 12.65* 12.81 12.52* 3.51 
InterestCov -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 -0.15 
IssuerSize -0.48*** -0.46*** -0.58*** -0.59*** 
ROA -1.74*** -1.78*** -1.85*** -1.45*** 
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.74 
F-Statistics 58.15 51.40 53.52 44.22 
Number of 
Observations 376 376 376 376 
Note:  *, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level respectively. 
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Table 18 Robustness Check with Fair Value Assets and Liability Measures 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝑂𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼4𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡+𝛼4𝐹𝑉𝐿1𝑖𝑡+𝛼5𝐹𝑉𝐿2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐹𝑉𝐿3𝑖𝑡+𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾0,…,5𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (8)  
 
Coefficient T-Value P-Value 
Intercept 2.99 0.42 0.68 
OrthRating -0.52 -4.68 <0.0001 
FVA1 -0.17 -2.58 0.02 
FVA2 -0.10 -2.16 0.04 
FVA3 0.81 1.71 0.09 
FVL1 -1.29 -1.88 0.08 
FVL2 -0.05 -0.26 0.79 
FVL3 -1.62 -1.63 0.10 
Underwriter 0.12 0.42 0.89 
Maturity 0.83 2.36 0.01 
IssueSize -0.18 -1.41 0.16 
Convertible 6.89 11.63 <0.0001 
Leverage 9.69 1.02 0.31 
InterestCov 0.06 0.49 0.63 
IssuerSize -0.47 -2.82 0.005 
ROA -1.81 -4.83 <0.0001 
Adjusted R2 0.73   
F-Statistics 44.4   
Number of Observations 376   
115  
Table 19 Robustness Check with Exclusion of Credit Rating Residuals 
 Model (2) Model (3) Model (6) Model (7) 
Explanatory 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept 13.84** 17.82*** 20.17*** 20.19*** 
FairValue -0.65**  -0.47*  
Level1  -0.05*  -0.10* 
Level2  -0.01*  -0.006 
Level3  0.05**  0.59*** 
Specialist   -0.66* -1.65*** 
FairValue*Specialist   -0.41***  
Level1*Specialist    -0.07 
Level2*Specialist    -0.01 
Level3*Specialist    -0.77*** 
Underwriter 0.29 0.22 0.33 0.21 
Maturity 0.42 -0.36 0.41 -0.18** 
IssueSize -0.36*** -0.39*** -0.29** -0.48* 
Convertible 6.28*** 6.19*** 7.40*** 6.62*** 
Leverage -2.34 -9.25 -6.18 15.05* 
InterestCov -0.08 -0.15 -0.05 -0.16 
IssuerSize -0.42*** -0.31*** -0.53*** -0.56*** 
ROA -0.97*** -0.88*** -0.87*** -0.96*** 
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.68 
F-Statistics 56.3 46.9 53.52 50.35 
Number of 
Observations 376 376 376 376 
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Table 20 Robustness Check with Exclusion of Convertible Bonds 
 Model (2) Model (3) Model (6) Model (7) 
Explanatory 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept 6.08 12.06 -3.49 -3.71 
OrthRating -0.36*** -0.25* -0.47*** -0.22* 
FairValue -1.19***  -2.37***  
Level1  -0.13***  -0.26*** 
Level2  -0.01*  -0.03* 
Level3  0.06**  0.07*** 
Specialist   -1.31*** -0.61*** 
FairValue*Specialist   -2.18***  
Level1*Specialist    -0.21*** 
Level2*Specialist    -0.03** 
Level3*Specialist    -0.97*** 
Underwriter -0.89*** -0.87*** -0.57* 0.44 
Maturity -0.67* -0.77** -0.35 -0.83** 
IssueSize -0.93*** -0.98*** -0.85** -0.99*** 
Leverage 17.01* 4.95 22.64*** 29.88*** 
InterestCov 0.11 -0.11 -0.02 -0.10 
IssuerSize -0.72*** -0.44*** -0.60*** -0.76*** 
ROA -1.04*** -0.70*** -1.42*** -1.07*** 
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.58 
F-Statistics 32.75 32.66 31.46 33.11 
Number of 




Table 21 Robustness Check with Crisis Dummy 
 Model (2) Model (3) Model (6) Model (7) 
Explanatory 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept -5.94 -2.05 -7.33 -4.80 
OrthRating -0.28** -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.22** 
FairValue -0.92**  -0.73**  
Level1  -0.02*  -0.25*** 
Level2  -0.01*  -0.04* 
Level3  0.05**  0.78*** 
Specialist   -0.07* -0.36 
FairValue*Specialist   -1.25**  
Level1*Specialist    -0.19** 
Level2*Specialist    -0.05* 
Level3*Specialist    -0.79*** 
Underwriter 0.78 0.25 0.03 0.38 
Maturity -1.08*** -0.77** -0.75* -0.77** 
IssueSize -1.02*** -0.19*** -0.14*** -1.08* 
Convertible -6.568*** -6.80*** -7.54*** -6.62*** 
Leverage 27.87*** 13.42 9.31 30.34*** 
InterestCov 0.13 -0.08 -0.08 -0.14 
IssuerSize -0.66*** -0.57*** -0.66*** -0.71*** 
ROA -1.03*** -1.87*** -1.69*** -1.05*** 
Crisis 1.85*** 0.40* 0.59* 0.53* 
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.71 0.74 0.69 
F-Statistics 58.26 56.81 54.26 48.63 
Number of 




Table 22 Robustness Check with MegaBank Dummy 
 Model (2) Model (3) Model (6) Model (7) 
Explanatory 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept -3.48 -1.58 -6.34 -5.21 
OrthRating -0.26** -0.50*** -0.48*** -0.18** 
FairValue -0.90**  -0.68**  
Level1  -0.03*  -0.25*** 
Level2  -0.01*  -0.03* 
Level3  0.04**  0.70*** 
Specialist   -0.05* -0.66 
FairValue*Specialist   -1.20**  
Level1*Specialist    -0.15** 
Level2*Specialist    -0.05* 
Level3*Specialist    -0.56*** 
Underwriter 0.89 0.70 0.05 0.50 
Maturity -2.01*** -1.02** -0.98* -0.99** 
IssueSize -2.02*** -1.21*** -1.25*** -2.03* 
Convertible -5.21*** -6.99*** -7.59*** -6.67*** 
Leverage 30.24*** 11.21 10.23 31.02*** 
InterestCov 0.21 -0.09 0.05 -0.16 
IssuerSize -0.99*** -0.71*** -0.85*** -0.73*** 
ROA -1.06*** -1.77*** -1.72*** -1.61*** 
MegaBank -1.52*** -1.35*** -1.59*** -1.58*** 
Adjusted R2 0.76 0.73 0.77 0.72 
F-Statistics 60.29 58.96 56.21 53.99 
Number of 
Observations 296 296 296 296 
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Table 23 Robustness Check with Multicollinearity of Control Variables 
 Model (2) Model (3) Model (6) Model (7) 
Explanatory 
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept 6.61*** 7.86*** 8.43*** 8.72*** 
OrthRating -0.29*** -0.41*** -0.37*** -0.43** 
FairValue -1.04***  -2.57**  
Level1  -0.02*  -0.15** 
Level2  -0.03***  -0.01* 
Level3  0.11**  0.19** 
Specialist   -0.05* -0.63 
FairValue*Specialist   -1.33***  
Level1*Specialist    -0.18** 
Level2*Specialist    -0.04 
Level3*Specialist    -0.16* 
Underwriter 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.05 
Maturity -0.61* -0.59* -0.57** -0.56** 
IssueSize -0.31*** -0.27*** -0.23*** -0.26** 
Convertible -6.15*** -6.40*** -7.25*** -7.18*** 
OrthLev -0.16 5.38 1.75 0.51 
OrthCov -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.11 
OrthSize -0.45*** -0.58*** -0.61*** -0.78*** 
OrthROA -0.65*** -0.68*** -6.29*** -0.69*** 
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.73 
F-Statistics 55.19 47.70 51.60 43.37 
Number of 
Observations 296 296 296 296 
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Level 1 inputs are quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets for 
identical assets or liabilities that the reporting entity has the ability to 
access at the measurement date. 
A Level 1 input will be available for many financial assets and 
liabilities, some of which might be exchanged in multiple active 
markets (for example, on different exchanges).  
Example 
Assume that the market price that would be received is $26, and 
transaction costs in that market are $3 (the net amount that would be 
received is $23). The fair value of the asset would be measured using 







Level 2 inputs are inputs other than quoted prices included within 
Level 1 that are observable for the asset or liability, either directly or 
indirectly through corroboration with observable market data 
(market-corroborated inputs). 
If the asset or liability has a specified (contractual) term, a Level 2 
input must be observable for substantially the full term of the asset or 
liability. An adjustment to a Level 2 input that is significant to the 
fair value measurement in its entirety might render the measurement 
a Level 3 measurement, depending on the level in the fair value 
hierarchy within which the inputs used to determine the adjustment 
fall. 
Example 
Receive-fixed, pay-variable interest rate swap based on the LIBOR 
swap rate. A Level 2 input would include the LIBOR swap rate if 
that rate is observable at commonly quoted intervals for the full term 







Level 3 inputs are unobservable inputs for the asset or liability, that 
is, inputs that reflect the reporting entity’s own assumptions about 
the assumptions market participants would use in pricing the asset or 
liability (including assumptions about risk) developed based on the 
best information available in the circumstances. 
Assumptions about risk include the risk inherent in a particular 
valuation technique used to measure fair value (such as a pricing 
model) and/or the risk inherent in the inputs to the valuation 
technique. 
Example 
Long-dated currency swap. A Level 3 input would include interest 
rates in a specified currency that are not observable and cannot be 
corroborated by observable market data at commonly quoted 
intervals or otherwise for substantially the full term of the currency 
swap. The interest rates in a currency swap are the swap rates 
calculated from the respective countries’ yield curves. 
*Note: The information in this table is adapted from the section, Fair Value Hierarchy, in 





Appendix 2 Variable Definitions 
Rating Ordinal numbers assigned to represent the rating symbols, having a 
value of 1 for the lowest rating, 2 for the second lowest rating, etc. 
YieldSpread The initial corporate bond yield minus the Treasury bond yield with 
comparable maturity. 
FairValue The percentage of assets and liabilities measured at fair value in the 
balance sheet over total assets reported in the balance sheet. 
Level1 The percentage of Level 1 fair value assets and Level 1 fair value 
liabilities deflated by total assets. 
Level2 The percentage of Level 2 fair value assets and Level 2 fair value 
liabilities deflated by total assets. 
Level3 The percentage of Level 3 fair value assets and Level 3 fair value 
liabilities deflated by total assets. 
Leverage Total liabilities deflated by total assets at end of the fiscal year 
immediately prior to the new corporate bond issuance date.. 
InterestCov Income before extraordinary items divided by interest expense for the 
year immediately prior to the bond issuance date. 
ROA Return on assets, net income deflated by total assets at the end of the 
fiscal year immediately prior to the corporate bond issuance date. 
IssuerSize The natural log of issuer's assets at end of the fiscal year immediately 
prior to the new corporate bond issuance date. 
Loss A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm’s ROA is negative 
and 0 otherwise. 
Underwriter A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the debt is issued by an 
underwriter and 0 otherwise. 
Maturity The natural logarithm of 1 plus the issue’s years to maturity 
IssueSize The natural logarithm of the issue proceeds 
Convertible A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the debt is convertible 
and 0 otherwise. 
OrthRating Residual of the regression with credit rating as dependent variable and 
FairValue, Specialist, Leverage, InterestCov, IssuerSize, Loss, ROA as 
independent variables.  
Specialist A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm hires an industry 
specialized auditor and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 3 Illustration of the Discrepancy between Sum of Fair Value Hierarchies 
and Total Fair Value
 
Note: The above table is adapted from the footnote of 2011 Annual Report of JPMorgan Chase & Co 
(p.189). The sum of Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 fair value is less than Total fair value because of the 
Netting Adjustments. 
